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JOHN MARSHALL, MCCULLOCH v.
MARYLAND, AND THE SOUTHERN
STATES' RIGHTS TRADITION
R. KENT NEWMYER*

INTRODUCTION

The Chief Justice was returning home to Richmond after
completing the 1819 term when he first heard that the Richmond
Junto, the nerve center of the reigning Jeffersonian Democratic
Republicans of Virginia, was mounting a major assault on his
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.! He expressed his chagrin and
his fears to Joseph Story, his colleague and chief ally on the Court:
"A deep design to convert our government into a meer [sic] league
of States has taken strong hold of a powerful & violent party in
Virginia...." Marshall continued:
The attack upon the judiciary is in fact an attack upon the union.
The judicial department is well understood to be that through which
the government may be attacked most successfully, because it is
without patronage, & of course without power, and it is equally well
understood that every subtraction from its jurisdiction is a vital
wound to the government itself. The attack upon it therefore is a
marked battery aimed at the government itself. The whole attack, if
not originating with Mr. Jefferson, is obviously approved & guided
by him. It is therefore formidable in other states as well as in this;
& it behooves the friends of the union to be more on the alert than
they have been.2
Marshall's fears were well-founded. The main assault began
on March 30, with two essays by Judge William Brockenbrough in
the Richmond Enquirer (the mouthpiece of the Richmond Junto).
On June 11, the next wave began with four essays by Spencer
Roane, leading judge on the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
and (adding to his states' rights credentials) the son-in-law of
Patrick Henry. The Virginia legislature soon chimed in with a
resolution condemning the decision and instructing Virginia's
congressional delegation to mount a campaign to curb the Court.
Professor of Law and History, University of Connecticut School
of Law.
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1821), in 9 THE

PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 184 (Henry A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974).
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Then, in the course of three years, came three books by John
Taylor of Caroline County, attacking McCulloch and other facets of
Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence. As Marshall predicted,
the anti-Court sentiment in Virginia spread to other states, so that
the 1820s saw a national anti-Court movement both in Congress
and at the state level. The attack was aimed not only at
McCulloch, but also at the Court, itself, and the Chief Justice.
Among the more radical proposals in circulation was one for a
separate new court to deal with federalism questions composed of
the chief justices of the several state courts. Another would make
the Senate the final court of appeals in such cases. Less drastic
was the move to require unanimity in all constitutional decisions.
Most feared, however, was the congressional effort to repeal
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which could be done by a
simple majority vote and would have given each state supreme
court the final say on constitutional issues. Under such a plan,
instead of one constitution, there would be, in time, as many
constitutions as there were states.
Open state resistance to the decisions of the Supreme Court
was another feature of the 1820s. Such resistance was, of course,
not new: witness Georgia's opposition to Chisholm v. Georgia,
Pennsylvania's defiance of United States v. Peters,4 and Virginia's
running jurisdictional battle with the Court culminating in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee.5 In the 1820s, however, such defiance became
contagious and endemic. Virginia led the way with the assault on
McCulloch and followed with an attack on Cohens v.Virginia6 in
1821. At the same time, Kentucky mobilized against Green v.
Biddle,7 which voided that state's claimant laws. Georgia would
ultimately do the same to the Marshall Court's Cherokee Indian
decisions.8 But before that, as the culmination of the court wars of
the 1820s, came John C. Calhoun's doctrine of nullification, set
forth in 1828 by the South Carolina legislature, as the "Exposition
and Protest." Calhoun's doctrine was implemented in 1832 when
South Carolina declared the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and
void-a position that the state threatened to back up with force if
necessary. Calhoun's doctrine was directed straight at Marshall's
opinion in Cohens (an opinion the South Carolinian once
defended). As he put it to Virgil Maxcy on September 1, 1831,
"The question is in truth between the people, & the Supreme
Court," and the people spoke through state government.! Calhoun

3. 2 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 419 (1793).

4. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Letter from John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy (Sept. 1, 1831), in
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drew on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, but the difference
was that he devised a formal constitutional mechanism to
implement the "spirit of '98." Prompted by McCulloch, the
constitutional dialectic of the 1820s generated a mode of
constitutional interpretation that states' rights supporters could
fight for and ultimately did.
At no time during American history, not even in the Courtpacking battle of the late 1930s, was there such a sustained
root-and-branch attack on the Supreme Court as an institution.
Nor, I contend, was there a time when the Court's powers were
more ably defended, or its place in the republican scheme of
government more clearly and fully expounded. The chief defender
and expounder, as it turned out, was the Chief Justice himself. It
is Marshall's response and relation to the states' rights theorists of
the 1820s that interests me for several reasons. First, their
dialectic with the Chief Justice is worth noting because it was a
unique episode in American constitutional history, one which
firmly locates Marshall in his own age and highlights some of his
lesser known personal qualities. More importantly, however,
Marshall's defense of McCulloch and the ensuing discourse takes
us to the heart of his jurisprudence. This is especially so
regarding his theory of federalism, which is not only not
consolidationist (as his critics maintained) but is far more nuanced
and more attentive to the needs and practices of state government
than is generally recognized.
In the process of refuting the charge of consolidation levelled
by his Virginia critics, Marshall also set forth his fullest exposition
of the Court's powers and, indeed, the role of the Supreme Court in
the republican scheme of government. McCulloch, therefore, plays
a central role in the development of Marshall's theory of judicial
review; in defending it, he expounded on the full interpretive
powers of the Court, which led directly to Cohens v. Virginia,
where he set forth the idea (which he did not do in Marbury) that
the Court's word had to be final."° Marshall's republican vision of
the Court as the final authority on the Constitution, I maintain,
would probably not have come into being without the concerted
opposition of states' rights theorists. However, what they helped
call into being, they also destroyed. Which is to say that
Marshall's view of the Court as the final authority on the
Constitution and the republican corrective for the disabilities of
republican government was undercut by the political victory of the
Jacksonians in 1828 and by Jackson's appointment of a new
majority on the Court. The great irony is that, despite this defeat,
Marshall's view of the Court became the model for subsequent

Galloway, Maxey, Marko papers, Library of Congress.
10. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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Courts and the governing assumption of constitutional
historiography (at least until the appearance of Bruce Ackerman's
revisionist scholarship).1
I. MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND AND12
"THESLEEPING SPIRIT OF VIRGINIA"

McCulloch was the watershed opinion which set in motion the
constitutional dialectic of the 1820s. Why Marshall's opinion
should have aroused "the violent party" in Virginia, as he called it,
and how it succeeded in discrediting the Court and isolating
Marshall from Virginia and Virginia from the nation is not
immediately clear. A national bank, as he pointed out in the
opinion, was neither a new institution to Virginia or the nation,
nor were the constitutional arguments supporting it new or
original. The First Bank of the United States ("BUS"), which
resembled its successor in every major respect, had been in
existence for twenty years before its charter was allowed to expire
in 1811. Washington had carefully considered the constitutional
question and so had the first Congress, which passed the charter.
Even though it was thoroughly Hamiltonian and highly opposed
by the agrarian wing of his own party, President Jefferson,
nonetheless, left the bank in place when he took office in 1801.
For ten more years, he and Madison continued to draw on its
services for the benefit of the nation. Four years without the bank
during the War of 1812 spoke eloquently as to the value of those
services. When the charter for the Second BUS was introduced in
1816, it had the support of President Madison, who signed the bill
into law, as well' as moderates in both political camps, including
John C. Calhoun, who led the pro-bank forces in the Senate. The
combined votes of senators and representatives in the nine
southern and western states, in favor of the bank, was 45 to 26.
Virginia was the only state whose representatives in Congress
voted against the bank. Even in Virginia, there were eleven votes
against and ten for, and the latter no doubt reckoned that a
branch would be located in Richmond."
Among those who
attacked Marshall for his opinion in McCulloch, as he suggested to

11. Ackerman challenges the traditional Court-centered narrative of
American constitutional history. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE (1991).

12. See, e.g., Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (March 24, 1819),
in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 280 (stating that "[o]ur opinion in the
bank case has roused the sleeping spirit of Virginia-if indeed it ever sleeps").
13. See CHARLES D. LOWERY, JAMES BARBOUR: A JEFFERSONIAN
REPUBLICAN 80-81 (1984) (discussing the composition of Richmond Junto and
the banking interests of some of its key cites); BRAY HAMMOND; BANKS AND
POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 240 (1957)

(examining the breakdown of the charter vote).
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Bushrod Washington, were many prominent BUS stockholders. 4
For example, Wilson Cary Nichols, the president of the Richmond
branch, was also a member of the Richmond Junto.
Given the long history of the national bank, its support
among moderates in both parties, and its integration into the
financial and political community of Richmond and Virginia, it is
not surprising that Marshall was caught off balance by the
vehemence of the attack on his opinion and on him personally.
Indeed, he concluded that it was not the bank, at all, or even the
doctrine of implied powers in the opinion that awakened Virginia's
"sleeping spirit." Instead, it was his forceful repudiation of the
states' rights theory set forth by counsel for Maryland, who rested
their case on the assumption that the Constitution was nothing
but a contract between sovereign states and ought, in doubtful
areas, be interpreted to privilege state sovereignty. The bank case
may have involved Maryland, but the theory put forth by Jones,
Martin, and Hopkinson for that state belonged to Virginia and
traced its lineage back to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.
Marshall saw the connection immediately and correctly assumed
that Jefferson, stirred by pride of authorship, was also stirring the
states' rights pot behind the scenes." "Ifthe principles which have
been advanced on this occasion were to prevail," he wrote to Story,
"the constitution would be converted into the old confederation." 6
But why, we might ask, was the tone so apocalyptic on both
sides? After all, states' rights theorizing had been around for a
long time; so had the BUS (if one counts Hamilton's first bank);
and so had Jefferson's vendetta against Marshall. So what
happened in 1819 and immediately thereafter to give such
doomsday meaning to old ideas and old enmities? One thing was a
rapid acceleration of market oriented capitalism, as reflected in
the Panic of 1819 and the onset of business cycles in American
history. The Second BUS was also a conspicuous feature, if not
the key symbol, of the new economic age. Marshall was right to
observe that Virginians were ambiguous, not to say hypocritical,
regarding the bank. Opposition to Hamilton's bank had been a
tenet of Virginia Republicanism from the 1790s. On the other
hand, the effort of Virginia Republicans to create an alternate
state banking system had been plagued with practical and
ideological problems from the beginning. In Marshall's opinion,
the Bank of Virginia, controlled by the Richmond Junto, was a
14. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (March 27, 1819) in
8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 281.

15. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Sept. 18, 1821), in 9
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 184 (demonstrating Marshall's harsh

assessment of Jefferson).
16. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 27, 1819), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 314.
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weak financial institution, which was no doubt why many
Virginians, including Marshall, preferred the Richmond Branch of
the national bank. But the disparity between the two banks was
precisely the point, since it seemed to illustrate the power of the
BUS to destroy state financial institutions. They had a point;
when the Second BUS called in loans to state banks, which they
had improvidently made, to cover its own debts, which it had
improvidently incurred, a default of banking institutions swept
like wild fire across the southern and western states. If the
"violent party" in Virginia wanted to dramatize the dangers of
market capitalism, if they needed an excuse for a direct attack on
Marshall and the Court, then the second BUS, under the
mismanagement of William Jones, was a gift from on high. 7
Marshall correctly assessed the provenance of Virginia's
attack on the Bank, but he underestimated the importance of the
doctrine of implied powers as a bone of contention. Fear of implied
powers had been a key feature of states' rights arguments in
Virginia going back to the ratification debates in 1788. It did not
help matters that the dispositive paragraph on the subject in
McCulloch came word-for-word from Hamilton. Circumstances in
1819 and the years immediately following made the doctrine even
more threatening than when Jefferson and Hamilton fought it out
in their famous memoranda on the bank in 1791. Not only did
McCulloch justify the hated bank, but it overrode Madison's
arguments set forth in his veto of the Bonus Bill in 1816, which
maintained that Congress could not authorize internal
improvements without a constitutional amendment. Marshall's
implied powers doctrine made an amendment unnecessary-a
point which became abundantly clear when, in an obiter dictum,
he referred to the need for federal improvements to bind together
the territories acquired in the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819.
Madison would ultimately reconcile himself to Marshall's view of
judicial review, but other Virginians did not. What they saw was
that McCulloch pitted the interpretive authority of the Court
against the states, acting as constitutionally designated agents in
the amending process. It was precisely this point that John C.
Calhoun's theory of nullification was designed to correct. 8
Lurking in the background of McCulloch, acting as inciting
factors in the attack on Marshall, were two other issues. One was
unspoken but specific in nature and omnipresent in states' rights
thinking. The other was general and historical in character. The
17. For the peculiar non-capitalist qualities of southern banking, see
BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE
OLD SOUTH 183-84 (1982).
18. On Madison's opposition to McCulloch as well as his final reconciliation
with Marshall and judicial review, see DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE
FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 68-70 (1989).
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specific issue was slavery, which came to be connected to
Marshall's doctrine of implied powers by the debates over
Missouri's entry into the union as a slave state in 1820 and 1821.
Strangely, little was said explicitly about the slavery issues in the
initial attack on McCulloch, but the connection was there to see.
After the Denmark Vesey abortive slave uprising in Charleston,
South Carolina in 1822, it was impossible to ignore. The danger
posed to agrarian slavery by McCulloch lay in the combination of
an implied powers doctrine with the growth of a northern majority
in Congress. If Congress could exceed the enumerated powers via
the "necessary and proper" clause and if the northern free state
interests could muster a majority in Congress, then they might
threaten slavery in the states where it existed or, as they
attempted to do in the Missouri debates, abolish it by statute in
the new territories. The point is not that Virginians perceived an
immediate threat to the "peculiar institution," but rather that
Marshall's opinion invited them to think comprehensively about
where they stood in the economic revolution gathering steam
across the land. Virginians heretofore noted for their moderation
and nationalism, now listened with new respect to the voices of
extremism: to publicists like John Taylor of Caroline County, to
professors like Nathaniel ("Beverley") and Henry St. George
Tucker (all touting the Articles of Confederation as the model
constitution), and to the mesmerizing oratory of John Randolph,
who declared that the Constitution was worth but "a fig" and
asked his fellow Virginians to calculate "the value of union." 9
Virginia, as Marshall understood, had come to a historic
crossroad. Like other states of the seaboard South, she faced an
economic dilemma of major proportions that carried a political and
ideological bite. The overarching question was whether or to what
degree the dominant slaveholding agrarian-planter interests of the
state could benefit by participating in the growing market
economy which the Constitution, as the Marshall Court construed
it, made possible. Fear of the present, uncertainty about the
future, and talk of decline were familiar to Virginians: hear Wirt's
lament as early as 1803 in his Letters of the British Spy, and
witness John Randolph's wistful longing for the cultural ways of
old England and old Virginia. More to the point, perhaps, was
Jefferson's effort to manufacture an Anglo-Saxon constitutional
tradition against which to measure the "honeyed Mansfieldism" of
Marshall and Story with its modernizing subtext. Still, one might
have expected that declining cotton prices, soil exhaustion, and the
19. See generally WILLIAM CABELL BRUCE, JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE,
1773-1833 (1970) (capturing the tone and substance of Randolph's biting
critique of new age culture). A large portion of Volume 1 is devoted to
Randolph's long career in Congress. Volume 1 also contains the quote from
the Annals of Congress. Id. at 492.
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prohibitive cost of maintaining a work force based on plantation
slavery would have inclined Virginians to retool, regroup, and
embrace market capitalism, economic specialization, and liberal
individualism. In fact, this is exactly what Marshall wanted to do
and what planters in the northern neck were inclined to do;
moreover, it is exactly what the democratic denizens of
transmontaine Virginia finally did. What the Old Dominion
conservatives did, instead, was to dig in their heels against
change, against the encroaching national market, against the
future, and against John Marshall and his view of the Court and
the Constitution. °
McCulloch was their cause celebre. On his return home from
the Court's session in 1819, he heard rumors that a newspaper
assault on his opinion was being mounted and that it was to be
branded as "damnablyheretical"as he put it to Story.2 ' The attack
was even more vehement, comprehensive, and long lasting than he
feared. Beginning on March 30 and running through June 22,
there appeared a series of anti-Court, anti-Marshall essays in the
Richmond Enquirer; two essays were written by William
Brockenbrough (writing as "Amphictyon") and four by Spencer
Roane (writing as "Hampden"). The intellectual cudgel was soon
picked up by John Taylor of Caroline County, Virginia's premier
theorist, who produced three books in three years to exorcise the
nationalist heresy introduced by Marshall's opinion. Abel Upshur
weighed in later with yet another tome. Before that, the Virginia
legislature got in the act with resolutions condemning both the
ideas and audacity of McCulloch. John Randolph of Roanoke
added some of his most impassioned oratory to the cause. In time,
both of St. George Tucker's sons, Henry St. George at the
University of Virginia and Beverley at William and Mary,
attempted to refute Marshall's nationalist position in their
lectures, articles and books.
The "great Lama [sic] of the
mountain" also descended from Olympus to join the fray, as
Marshall noted bitterly to Story. 3 Jefferson did not openly engage
Marshall, and no doubt, the attack would have occurred without
him. But as Roane noted, the ex-president was the spiritual
godfather of states' rights. Jefferson proudly assumed the role,
spurring others (including Roane) to action and putting his
20. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON 11-18 (1994) (discussing the Jefferson's study of the Saxon
constitution and his opposition to Lord Mansfield).
21. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (March 24, 1819), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 280.
22. See generally ELIZABETH K. BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION: 1700-1860 (1952) (discussing the treatises of Taylor, Upshur,
and Henry St. George Tucker).
23. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1821), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 183 (referring to Jefferson).
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imprimatur on the attack, in general. Marshall paid his arch
antagonist a backhanded compliment by assuming that he was
responsible for spreading Virginia theory to other states.24
Marshall did not foresee the specific course of antebellum
history, but experience taught him to read history in a tragic light.
Like his old friend Adams, he feared that the rousing oratory of
Virginia radicals would convert the Constitution into the old
Confederation.2 5 He viewed the crisis of the 1820s not only as
someone who thought of himself as an American, but also as one
who loved Virginia and believed that nationalism and state
interests were inseparably connected, not mutually exclusive. He
also believed that McCulloch provided for precisely that symbiotic
connection between national and state power. In order to prove
this point and show that the charges of consolidationism leveled
against him were both false and dangerous, he decided to answer
Brockenbrough and Roane. He knew the risk of going public, and
it was something he had deliberately avoided following the
impeachment of Chase in 1805.
He surely appreciated the
contradictions of doing so in light of his effort to cast the Court as
a legal institution and to leave politics to the political branches
and the politicians. What called him to the barricades in 1819 was
the realization that the Court was already at the center of a
political storm (which it was), and his fear that the states' rights
conflagration in Virginia might spread to other states. History
was repeating itself; it was the ratification struggle, the 1790s,
and the first campaign against Jefferson all over again. If Virginia
would do right, she might save herself and regain the position of
honor in the councils of the nation that she once had. So he took
up his pen and entered the political fray to defend both the
Constitution and the Court. Neither would survive in the form he
hoped, but his efforts left an indelible mark on the American
constitutional tradition and on the Supreme Court as an
institution.
II.

DEFENDING MCCULLOCH:

BALANCING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STATES' RIGHTS

The assault began on March 23 when the Richmond Enquirer
published the text of Marshall's opinion in McCulloch.
Accompanying the opinion was a proclamation by Thomas Ritchie,
editor of the Enquirer and leader of the Richmond Junto (and
son-in-law of Roane), praising the Virginia and Kentucky
24. Scholars are indebted to Gerald Gunther for discovering and reclaiming
the text of many of these remarkable essays and for his insightful introduction
to them. See generally JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter GUNTHER].
25. Letter from John Marshall to Story (May 27, 1819), in 7 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL, at 314.
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Resolutions and. demanding that Marshall's heretical departure
from them "be controverted and exposed." A week later Ritchie
put his editorial imprimatur on the first of two essays by William
Brockenbrough, also a member of the Junto. Following these,
beginning June 11 and ending June 22, were Roane's four essays,
which were much attended to because he was the leading judge on
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Marshall answered
Brockenbrough with two "A Friend of the Union" essays which
appeared in the Philadelphia Union and the Alexandria Gazette.
By publishing in Philadelphia, Marshall no doubt hoped to
preserve his anonymity, but the essays were so badly mangled in
the printing that he instructed Justice Bushrod Washington, who
was his accomplice in the venture, to place them in the Gazette
and Alexandria Daily Advertiser, where they appeared with
Marshall's corrections. Marshall answered Roane in nine essays
written under the nom de plume, "A Friend of the Constitution,"
which appeared in the Gazette from June 30 to July 15.6
Marshall's essays not only responded directly to the charges
against him, but they also stand as a coherent and carefully
structured statement on the nature and location of power in the
federal system. Brockenbrough and Roane, though perfectly
united in their distaste for McCulloch, did not synchronize their
efforts nearly as well-a fact which gave Marshall a leg up.
"Amphictyon I" was short, hesitant in tone, highly derivative, and
quoted verbatim and at length from the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions. Brockenbrough's second essay, perhaps in response
to Marshall's heated reply, focused on the specifics of implied
powers. It was decidedly harder-hitting, but it did not soar.
Roane's essays, however, took the argument to another level in
more ways than one. They were highly personal in tone and laced
throughout with irony and sarcasm; they were also learned in the
law, brilliantly argued, and comprehensive. The focus was on
McCulloch and the doctrine of implied powers, but Roane drew
freely on anti-federalist arguments first made in the Virginia
ratifying debates, especially those of his father-in-law Patrick
Henry. Like Brockenbrough, he drew freely on the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions as well as Madison's Virginia Report of
1799, which was a brilliant restatement of the Virginia
Resolutions of the previous year. Roane quietly cast aside
Madison's subtle qualifications, however, and opted for absolute
state sovereignty.
With independence from England, his
26. See GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 12-13 (discussing Marshall's efforts to
accurately print his essays through the good offices of Bushrod Washington).

On Roane and confrontation with Marshall, see Samuel R. Olken, "John
Marshall and Spencer Roane: An Analysis of their Conflict over U.S. Supreme
Court Appellate Jurisdiction," JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY (1990),
125-41.
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argument went, sovereignty (itself indivisible) devolved on each of
the new states. The Constitution of 1787, which was ratified by
state conventions, was a contract created by sovereign people in
the sovereign states who were parties to the contract. Therefore,
he maintained, the purpose of the Constitution and the very
essence of constitutionalism, itself, was to limit the national
government, not to strengthen and empower it, as Marshall
contended in McCulloch. If the states were truly sovereign and
the Constitution was a mere contract among states, rather than
the creation of the entire American people speaking collectively,
then all doubtful cases of interpretation went automatically to the
states and not the national government. By this standard-and it
was the gravamen of Roane's entire argument-Marshall's grant
of discretionary power via the Necessary and Proper Clause was
blatant usurpation.
The Chief Justice gave as good as he got, which is to say that
he came out swinging, responding first to Brockenbrough's essays
of March 30 and April 2. "Amphictyon" I and II contained more
assertion than argument, but nonetheless, they defined the issues
and established the ironic, sarcastic tone of the entire debate.
Brockenbrough referred to Marshall as a judge "of the most
profound legal attainments" and admitted that his opinion was
"very able." 7 Nevertheless, there were problems. One was that
Marshall's opinion was far too sweeping, and another was that his
weak-kneed colleagues uncritically followed him. Moreover, the
Chief Justice, for all of his claims of impartiality, was blinded by
Federalist politics and Hamiltonian values. For these reasons, the
Court's decision was "not more binding or obligatory than the
opinion of any other six intelligent members of the community." 28
As for the true view of the Court's power of review, Brockenbrough
cited Roane's opinion for the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
Hunter v. Martin,9 which repudiated the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction under Section 25. For the true view of the
Constitution, he quoted at length from the third resolution of
Madison's 1799 Report.
He concluded by addressing the
dangerous policy consequences of McCulloch, expanding beyond
just the scope of the Bank and touching on internal improvements,
education, the promotion of agriculture, poor relief, as well as
religion. On all counts, he concluded that Marshall's enlarged
"construction is inadmissible.""
While Marshall's first essay (April 24) began to address the
substantive issues of judicial authority and implied powers, it
made a special effort to disarm his critics by exposing the
27. Id. at 54 (reprinting "Amphictyon I").
28. Id. at 55.
29. 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1816).
30. See GUNTHER, supra note 24,Id. at 75.
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hyperbolic nature of their charge and the cynicism of their
motives. He targeted not only Amphictyon, but also Ritchie and
the whole states' rights party of Virginia. Here, he repeated in
public what he had written in private: that the attack on
McCulloch had little to do with the BUS, which "had become law,
without exciting a single murmur," but was merely the occasion
"for once more agitating the publick [sic] mind, and reviving those
unfounded jealousies by whose blind aid ambition climbs the
ladder of power."3 The Court was attacked because it couldn't
answer back. The purpose of the assault was simply to bring the
Justices into disrepute, to distort the way they did business, which
was collective in nature and not the monopoly of one man.
On top of that, "Amphictyon" and "Hampden" deliberately
mangled what the Court had said. "It cannot escape any attentive
observer that Amphictyon's strictures on the opinion of the
supreme court, are founded on a total and obvious perversion of
the plain meaning of that opinion, as well as on a misconstruction
of the constitution."32 Besides, it was not the Court's decision that
changed the Constitution, but critics, like counsel for Maryland
echoed by "Amphictyon," who introduced states' rights theories
from the 1790s to make their case. If Marshall's critics branded
him as a consolidationist, he branded them as radical ideologues
who wanted to undo the Constitution and return the country to
the chaos of the 1780s. In short, he felt that they wanted to
redirect the entire course of American constitutional history. As
he put it:
[Tihe principles maintained by the counsel for the state of
Maryland, and by Amphictyon, would essentially change the
Constitution, render the government of the Union incompetent to
the objects for which it was instituted, and place all its powers
under the control of the state legislatures. It would, in a great
measure, reinstate the old confederation.3 3
Whether, given the radical transforming nature of the
Constitution itself, Marshall was entitled to stake out the
conservative ground here and brand his opponents as radicals is
perhaps an open question. On one point, however, he was correct:
that his states' rights critics looked to the Articles of
Confederation, not the Constitution, as the true republican
constitution.
The Marshall-Brockenbrough exchange cast the debate as a
mix of history, law, and ideology. Just as clearly, it was a
confrontation of personalities and a war of reputations. Thus, as
was the habit in Virginia, it was a matter of honor. The more so

31. Id. at 78 (reprinting Marshall's "A Friend of the Union" essays)
32. Id. at 99-100.

33. Id. at 99.
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when the Chief Justice of the United States took up his pen to
refute and discredit the leading judge of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, whose "Hampden" essays picked up where
Amphictyon left off. Spencer Roane, "the great judge," as Marshall
sarcastically called him, was a formidable combatant. As the
leading judge of Virginia's highest court, he spoke with special
authority. In addition, although he was not actively engaged in
Junto politics, he had been intimately connected with the states'
rights movement in Virginia for more than two decades. Almost
certainly, he was consulted about the plan to diminish Marshall's
influence.
Like Brockenbrough, Thomas Ritchie, in his
introductory paragraph to Roane's "Hampden" I, rhetorically
conceded that the Supreme Court "is a tribunal of great and
commanding authority," and, admittedly, the Chief Justice is a
judge of "great abilities."34 Nevertheless, Ritchie maintained, the
Court's opinions must not be received from on high as "'the law
and the prophets'. . . nor should Marshall's opinion be
canonized."35 Stripped of false politeness and phony compliments,
both Ritchie and Roane took the position that Marshall was simply
dead wrong and had to be brought down. Ritchie, introducing
Roane's "Hampden" essays, wanted the people of Virginia and the
members of the General assembly, who were scheduled to meet at
the end of the year, "'to ...hear him for his cause.'"6 That famous
phrase, straight from the Patrick Henry speech that launched the
Revolution in Virginia in 1765, said it all. It was the Revolution
all over again, and Roane was Patrick Henry stepping forth to
defend liberty from the evils of consolidating and corrupting
power. Roane alerted the reader that the cause was the "Rights of
'The States,' and of 'The People,'" 7 The text to be explicated was
the Tenth Amendment, which reserved to the states all powers not
delegated to the national government. 8
Roane's four essays were orchestrated for maximum impact.
They appeared at regular three or four day intervals over the
period from June 11 to 22, giving readers a chance to digest and
discuss the complex issues. Though skillfully interconnected and
even repetitious (not unwise given the complexities of the
argument), each essay fit into the overall argument. The first
threw down the gauntlet in general terms and set the tone of the
debate. The second bore down on the general constitutional theory
of implied powers The third focused sharply on Marshall's
opinion, taking his argument up point by point. The final piece
34. Id. at 106 (reprinting Thomas Ritchie's introductory paragraph to the
"Hampden" essays).
35. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 106.

36. Id. (italics in original).
37. Id. at 106.
38. Id. at 108.
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attacked the jurisdiction of the Court itself and, by necessary
implication, Marshall's entire concept of judicial review. Roane's
rhetorical strategy throughout was to submerge his own voice in
the collective wisdom of Virginia. The issue was tyranny, "the
proneness of all men to extend and abuse their power."39 The evil
was not England, as it had been in the decade before the
Revolution, but "our federal rulers," whose deliberate aim was to
"obliterate the state governments, forever, from our political
system." ' Or again, the problem was "a renegado [sic] congress,"
which had adopted "the outrageous doctrine of Pickering, Lloyd, or
Sheffey,""' and yet again, "the parasites of a government gigantic
in itself" who were "turn-coats and apostates." 2
Chief among those "turn-coats" and traitors to liberty was the
Chief Justice and his colleagues, who by "a judicial coup de main,"
in McCulloch, gave "a general letter of attorney to the future
legislators of the union."13

That opinion by the man who

"eulogized" Hamilton and supported his consolidationist
philosophy, was "the 'Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the
end, the first and the last-of federal usurpations."'" Roane's self
designated role was to arouse the people of Virginia who "are sunk
in apathy, ... sodden in the luxuries of banking," who have given
in to "[a] money-loving, funding, stock-jobbing spirit,... [and who]

are almost prepared to sell our liberties for a 'mess of pottage."''
The problem, it would appear, was not that market capitalism was
failing but that it was succeeding too well. To rouse them from
their prosperity-induced "torpor,"6 Roane presumed to speak for
"our forefathers, of glorious and revolutionary memory," 7 for
Mason and Henry and Jefferson. His goal was "liberty.""' His
"Magna Charta" and "political bible" was Madison's "celebrated
report to the legislature of Virginia, in the year 1799.""9 Virginia
wisdom, illuminated by the common law itself (at least as it was
practiced in Roane's court) would reveal Marshall's tyrannous
usurpation. Of necessity, Marshall, himself, would be exposed for
the traitor he was, and by his next door neighbor, no less.
Historians and mythmakers (who are sometimes one and the
same) agree that Marshall was an even-tempered, moderate, and
superbly rational man who brought those personal qualities to his
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
supra note 24, at 107.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 114.
GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 112.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
GUNTHER,
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job as Chief Justice. And so he did. As a "Friend to the Union,"
and "Friend of the Constitution," however, he was not speaking for
the Court but for himself. He could take off the judicial gloves and
did just that, lashing back at his critics as "certain restless
politicians of Virginia,"5° a party of "skilful [sic] engineers,""' who
set out to destroy the Court because it lacked "power" and
"patronage" and was "without the legitimate means of ingratiating
itself with the people." 2 Nor was that the worst of their sins.
Attacking the Court, Marshall charged, was really their way of
destroying the Union itself and the Constitution, which bound it
together. Here, he spoke passionately of the "zealous and
persevering hostility" of Virginia states' rights supporters, going
back to the original ratification debates, and their effort "to
reinstate that miserable confederation, whose incompetency to the
preservation of our union" was so abundantly demonstrated by
"the short interval between the Treaty of Paris and the meeting of
the general convention at Philadelphia." 3 This, then, was the
glorious tradition of Virginia that Hampden with his "ranting
declamation" and "rash impeachment" of the Court sought to
resuscitate.54
This was not the easy-going, fun-loving John Marshall whom
Richmonders knew and loved.
What they thought of his
transformation into a fighting polemicist we can only surmise, but
it was clear to all that he put his reputation on the line and bet his
character, so to speak, against that of his adversary. If the
congenial, kindly, and neighborly Marshall was that agitated, the
message said, then there must be good reason. Marshall not only
spoke from passionate conviction, but also from a strength, which
was a special blend of textual analysis and doctrinal exegesis
fashioned into a sustained argument that seemed plain as day and
above mere partisan bickering. The main point to be refuted was
Roane's contention that McCulloch-its historical foundation, its
doctrine, its rules of interpretation, as well as its practical
consequences-was consolidationist and that it would literally
obliterate the states themselves. Marshall answered each element
in Roane's charge, but not before charging him with deliberately
misrepresenting what the Court actually said. Judicial opinions,
he observed, especially concerning "[g]reat constitutional
questions," often "depend on a course of intricate and abstruse
reasoning, which it requires no inconsiderable degree of mental
exertion to comprehend, and which may, of course, be grossly
50. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 153 (reprinting Marshall's "AFriend of the

Constitution" essays).
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
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misrepresented."55 By Marshall's reckoning, this was precisely
what Hampden had done, beginning with his allegation that the
Court had gone outside the record to decide the case.5 6
Marshall, hurt by the accusation, rose to the defense of his
colleagues. "Their construction may be erroneous," he conceded
and may certainly be "open to argument."" But the notion that
the decision was an act of judicial usurpation "exists only in the
imagination of Hampden"6 and "can impose on no intelligent
man."59 Marshall was probably sincere in his outrage, but Roane's
claim that the cause was improperly before the Court ought not to
be dismissed as mere malice. At the very least, we need to
recognize that the origins of the case were much more complex and
murky than either Marshall admitted or the formal record
revealed. Indeed, as Richard Ellis has shown, there was a strong
element of collusion in the bank case.6" In fact, the governor of
Maryland mentioned publicly that the decision by the Maryland
Court of Appeals "was there had by consent" so that it could be
carried to the Supreme Court for final decision. 6' Noticeably, too,
there was no real opposition to the decision in Maryland, even
though it went against the state-most probably because the
major economic players favored the bank. Justified or not,
Marshall's high dudgeon served a rhetorical purpose. The point of
the first exchange was that Roane was playing games with the
reader, whom Marshall either explicitly or implicitly described as
the model republican citizen. By distorting the words and the
work of the Supreme Court, Roane was counting on emotion and
fear rather than rational argument, which was a decidedly
unrepublican thing to do. Marshall admonished his readers to
read the opinion for themselves, which he sarcastically noted was
more than Roane had done."
Having neutralized "the bitter invectives which compose the
first number of Hampden," and perhaps even have turned them to
his own favor, Marshall then proceeded "to a less irksome taskthe examination of his arguments," beginning with the assertion
that "the constitution conveyed only a limited grant of powers to
the general government, and reserved the residuary powers of the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 156.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 159.
Id.
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Historians meeting in Washington, D.C. (1995).
61. Governor Charles Ridgley, Speech (July 8, 1818), in MD. GAZETTE AND
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government to the states and to the people." 3 The advantage of
dealing with this principle of limited national sovereignty was that
Marshall agreed with it and, in fact, begged leave "to add to the
numerous respectable authorities quoted by Hampden in support
of it."64 Among the authorities Marshall threw back at Roane was
his own argument in McCulloch:
The government (of the United States) is acknowledged by all to be
one of the enumerated powers. The principle that it can exercise
only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have
required to be enforced by all those arguments which its enlightened
friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary
to urge. That principle is now universally admitted.65
What Marshall had done in "A Friend of the Constitution" II
was what common law lawyers often did in pleadings when they
demurred; that is, they admitted to the truth of what their
adversary charged, but denied the legal consequences that
presumed to flow from it.
Hampden's "incontrovertible"
propositions, "if admitted to be true, so far from demonstrating the
error of that opinion [McCulloch], do not even draw it into
question. They may be all true, and yet every principle laid down
in the opinion be perfectly correct."6
Marshall's tactics were
effective both rhetorically and substantively.
Rhetorically
speaking, he permitted Virginia readers to agree with much of
what Roane said about states' rights, which they probably were
inclined to do anyhow. At the same time, he backed away from the
union-busting, Constitution-destroying implications
of his
position.
More to the point, however, by arguing that the national
government was limited by the Constitution and that states' rights
were constitutionally protected, Marshall argued what he
sincerely believed and set forth as law in his Bank opinion. For
him, as for the framers, there was a fundamental distinction
between sovereignty as the ultimate foundation of the government
and sovereignty as the actual power to govern. The former was
indivisible and rested with the American people; the latter was
divisible and had, in fact, been divided by the Constitution
between the states and the federal government. Here then was
Marshall's theory of divided sovereignty. It was, as he admitted,
not easy to understand. This was especially so when he added his
final corollary. What Marshall expected his republican readers to
understand was that the powers given to the national government
were not only limited (because they were divided) but that they

63. Id. at 161.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 161-62.

66. Id. at 161.
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were also supreme. Compared to Roane's simple, monolithic
theory of state supremacy, Marshall's principle of divided
sovereignty was subtle and complex. It rested, to paraphrase a
line from Holmes, not on logic but rather on common sense and
historical experience.
What the practical-minded framers
recognized in 1787 was that any constitution which attempted to
obliterate state government (in an age when local government was
all that people knew) would be doomed from the start. What
Marshall assumed he was doing was reaffirming the wisdom of the
framers. But in the 1820s, wisdom was one thing, security
another. For Virginians, surrounded as they were by uncertainty
and beleaguered by anxiety, complexity was a hard sell. Marshall
had the experience and intent of the framers on his side; Roane
had logic and the deep insecurity of Virginians.
In defending McCulloch's doctrine of divided sovereignty
against Roane's passionate, doctrinal assault, Marshall fell back,
as he had done in Marbury and would soon do in Cohens v.
Virginia, on Federalist constitutional theory or "American
principles," as he called them. In this scheme of government, the
sovereign authority in the republic belongs to the American
people, who speak only in the constitutional convention and who
have spoken through a written constitution, which is the supreme
law of the land. In that constitution, the actual power to govern
(distinct from the question of ultimate sovereignty) is divided
between the states and the nation. In his first response to Roane,
Marshall put the matter in plain language that ordinary citizens
could understand:
In fact, the government of the union, as well as those of the states, is
created by the people .... who administer it for their own good ....
The constitution has defined the powers of the government, and has
established that division of power which its framers, and the
American people, believed to 67be most conducive to the public
happiness and to public liberty.
Marshall wanted a system of duel federalism, one which balanced
the rights of the states with those of the national government:
The equipoise thus established is as much disturbed by taking
weights out of the scale containing the powers of the [central]
government, as by putting weights into it. His hand is unfit to hold
the state balance who occupied himself entirely in giving a
preponderance to one of the scales. 8
Marshall's last point was a simple but compelling one in terms of
the debate: it was not the national government but the states that
were claiming absolute authority. Roane and his colleagues in the
Junto were the radical purists, not Marshall and the Court.
67. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 159-60.
68. Id. at 160.
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The next phase of the debate shifted from general
constitutional theory to the interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Here, the exchange quickly devolved into a battle
of uncommonly able common law lawyers over common law
hermeneutics. Roane looked to Vattel to support his argument
"[tihat the limited grant to Congress of certain enumerated
powers, only carried with it such additional powers as were fairly
incidental to them, or, in other words, were necessary and proper
for their execution." 9 Marshall admitted the point (saying that it
was in fact what McCulloch said) but disputed Roane's use of
Vattel, who, according to Marshall, really said something entirely
different.7" For lawyer Marshall,
[tihe only principle which can be extracted from Vattel, and safely
laid down as a general independent rule is, that parts are to be
understood according to the intention of the parties, and shall be
construed liberally, or restrictively, as may best promote the objects
for which they were made.71
Roane responded with his heavy artillery, citing the
formidable Lord Coke to prove that the word "necessary" in the
Necessary and Proper Clause meant nothing. Marshall objected
this time on two grounds. The first was that Roane did not know
his Coke (almost a indictable offense in Richmond legal circles).
Marshall's second and more revealing objection was that law did
not always supply a "technical rule applicable to every case, which
enjoins us to interpret arguments in a more restricted sense than
their words import."72 Marshall was subtly working his way from
the common law to common sense (arguing of course that both
were the same). The common law, common sense view was that
"[tihe nature of the instrument, the words that are employed, the
object to be effected, are all to be taken into consideration, and
have their due weight." 3 Interpretation, in other words, is subject
to "that paramount law of reason, which pervades and regulates
all human systems."7' The Constitution was not controlled by
ordinary common law, however much of the spirit and principles of
that law may have insinuated itself into the document. What
Roane had done, Marshall went on to explain, was to take those
narrowly focused principles of the common law, which applied to
contracts between individuals, and make them the touchstone of
the constipated constitutional interpretation that he wanted.
In McCulloch, Marshall urged the people to remember "that it
69. See Id. at 115 (reprinting Roane's "Hampden" II essay).
70. See Id. at 163 (stating that "[t]he proposition itself, I am perfectly
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is a constitution we are expounding."75 In answering Roane, he
exegeted those now famous words with Edmund Burke to guide
him. What he said goes to the heart of his constitutional
philosophy:
[The Constitution] is not a contract between enemies seeking each
other's destruction, and anxious to insert every particular, lest a
watchful adversary should take advantage of the omission. -Nor is
it a case where implications in favor of one man impair the vested
rights of another. Nor is it a contract for a single object, every thing
relating to which, might be recollected and inserted. It is the act of
a people, creating a government, without which they cannot exist as
a people. The powers of this government are conferred for their own
benefit, are essential to their own prosperity, and are to be exercised
for their good, by persons chosen for that purpose by themselves...
. It is intended to be a general system for all future times, to be
adapted by those who administer it, to all future occasions that may
come within its own view. From its nature, such an instrument can
describe only the great objects it is intended to accomplish, and state
in general terms, the specific powers which are deemed necessary to
those objects. 6
Here, I submit, was the single most telling statement in his
debate with Hampden, one that all Virginians, lawyers or not,
could comprehend. Marshall put his reputation as a lawyer, as a
Virginian, and as a statesman of the Revolution on the line for
America. Roane did the same. Arguing from The Federalist
papers, common law, history, and whatever was available, Roane
insisted that McCulloch had transformed the Necessary and
Proper Clause into a grant of additional power to Congress when,
in fact, that clause, if it was not merely "tautologous and
redundant" verbiage, was meant to delimit congressional power
and reaffirm the limiting nature of constitutional government.77
Marshall responded point-by-point and with what seemed at times
mind-numbing detail. Whether he argued from the common law,
or The Federalist papers, or Hamilton's memorandum to
Washington in 1791, he fell back on one fundamental axiom: that
the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the Court interpreted it in
McCulloch, did not grant Congress additional powers and,
therefore, did not destroy the concept of a national government of
enumerated powers. The one and only thing it did was grant to
Congress the legislative means necessary to effect the specific
powers granted to it by Article I, Section 8, which was the same
range of discretion that Congress would have had if the Clause
had not been inserted. This, Marshall maintained, was all the
Court said and meant to say. When Roane claimed otherwise, he
75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
76. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 170-71.
77. Id. at 125 (reprinting Roane's "Hampden" III essay).
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"misstates either directly or by insinuation" what the Court said."8
The plain sense of the matter, put "without fear of
contradiction," was this:
[Tihat the general principles maintained by the supreme court are,
that the constitution may be construed as if the clause which has
been so much discussed, had been entirely omitted. That the powers
of congress are expressed in terms which, without aid, enable and
require the legislature to execute them, and of course, to take the
means for their execution. That the choice of these means devolved
on the legislature, whose right, and whose duty it is, to adopt those
which are most advantageous to the people, provided they be within
the limits of the constitution. Their constitutionality depends on
their being the natural, direct, and appropriate means, or the known
and usual means, for the execution of a given power. 79
This does not mean that the Constitution is a blank check to
Congress (as Roane claimed and as some historians have assumed
Marshall meant). "In no single instance does the court admit the
unlimited power of Congress to adopt any means whatever, and
thus to pass the limits prescribed by the constitution."80 If it did
so, if
[Clongress under the pretext of executing its powers, passed] laws
for the accomplishment of objects, not entrusted to the government,
it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was
not the law of the land.8'
Marshall's point was telling: judicial review, which the states'
rights forces were attacking, was the quintessential instrument of
limited government which they liked.
Marshall would return to defend the Court's powers of review
again in his final essay and more forcefully in Cohens v. Virginia,
but before he did so, he circled back, in Essays VI and VII, to the
central theme of divided sovereignty. In these essays, Marshall
confronted Hampden's oft-repeated charge that McCulloch made
the Constitution into "a consolidated, and not a federal
government," and that the states would be annihilated in the
process." To make his point yet again and for a final time that
McCulloch did no such thing, Marshall quoted no less than twelve
specific instances from the opinion's text that acknowledged the
constitutional foundation of states' rights. Additionally, for good
measure, he zeroed in on state taxing power, which was at issue in
McCulloch, and quoted from that opinion:

78. Id. at 186.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 186-87.
81. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 187 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland).
82. Id. at 192.
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That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is
retained by the states; that it is not abridged by the grant of a
similar power to the government of the union; that it is to be
concurrently exercised by the two governments; are truths which
have never been denied.83
"Two governments"-the
nation and the states-was
Marshall's mantra, and to reach states' rights doubters in
Virginia, he cited one of their own. Now it was not just Marshall
against Roane but James Madison, too, who said in The Federalist
No. 39 that the Constitution "is neither a national, nor a federal
constitution; but a composition of both." 4 Marshall next addressed
Federalist constitutional theory and Hampden's charge that the
only "people" in the constitutional formula of the republic were
people of the states. Contrary to "Hampden," the Court, like the
old Federalists, recognized the bedrock idea that "the people were
divided into distinct societies" called states. 8 But this fact does
not mean there. were no "people of the United States."" Does
Hampden deny this? "Have we no national existence? We were
charged by the late emperor of France with having no national
character," said Marshall, drawing on his experience in the XYZ
mission.87 Marshall continued, saying:
[B]ut not even [the emperor of France] denied our theoretical or
constitutional existence. If congress declares war, are we not at war
as a nation? Are not war and peace national acts? Are not all
measures of the government national measures? The United States
is a nation; but a nation composed of states in many, though not in
all respects, sovereign. The people of these states are also the
people of the United States. The two characters, so far from being
incompatible with each other, are identified. This is the language of
the constitution.88
This is what McCulloch proclaimed and what the American people
in their sovereign capacity mandated at the time of ratification.
Marshall's final statement on divided sovereignty, presented
in Essay VII, was a refutation of Roane's states' rights ratification
theory. Like the anti-federalists before him and John C. Calhoun
afterwards, Roane rested his case for state sovereignty on the fact
that ratification took place in specially called state conventions
elected by the people of each state. From that he deduced that the
Constitution was simply a contract created by sovereign states as
the primary contracting parties; the national government was
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nothing but "an alliance, or a league" of sovereign states. 9 As a
creature of the states, the Constitution ought to be construed to
favor them-that is to say that the benefit of the doubt, in cases
like McCulloch, should go automatically to states who, in fact,
should be the final judges of the constitutionality of congressional
acts.
Marshall's response was simple and common sensical.
Ratification took place at the state level, not because the states
were sovereign, but because that was the only practical and
convenient way to proceed, since the American people could not
ratify en masse.
Or, to put it another way, it was the
representatives of the whole American people meeting in various
states that decided the issue of ratification.
Beyond that,
Federalist constitutional theory applied: if the sovereign people
wanted to divide governmental powers between the national
government and the states, they had the ultimate authority to do
so. If they wanted to make the government of the nation supreme
within its sphere of action, they could do that too. And that,
according to Marshall's climactic argument, is precisely what they
did:
I will premise that the constitution of the United States is not an
alliance, or a league, between independent sovereigns; nor a
compact between the government of the union, and those of the
states; but is itself a government, created for the nation by the
whole American people, acting by convention assembled in and for
their respective states. 9°
Moreover, he continued:
[Tihe government of the union, 'within its sphere of action,' is
'supreme'; and, although its laws should be in direct opposition to
the instruction of every state legislature in the union, they are 'the
supreme law of the land, any thing in the
91 constitution or laws of any
states to the contrary notwithstanding.
By connecting the words of the Constitution (specifically, the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI) with the historical framework of
the Constitution itself, Marshall finally rested his case on the
experience of history and the wisdom of the founders. Marshall
saw the Articles of Confederation, which Virginia theorists pushed
as the essence of constitutional wisdom, as "that awful and
instructive period in our history."92
The weakness of the
Confederation
led to "'national disorder,
poverty, and
insignificance,'" said Marshall, quoting Hamilton's FederalistNo.
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15. 93 In 1787, the American people were faced with a choice: either

transform the Articles into
[An effective government [under the Constitution], or . . . fall to
pieces from the weight of its constituent parts, & the weakness of its
cement .... The wisdom and patriotism of our country chose the
former. Let us not blindly and inconsiderately replunge into the
difficulties from which that wisdom and that patriotism have
extricated us. 9 4
Marshall's final "Friend of the Constitution" essay appeared
on July 15, 1819, leaving us to ponder the consequences and
historical significance of his debate with Roane and
Brockenbrough. Certainly, the dialogue was remarkable in the
annals of American constitutional history for the fact that the
chief judicial officers of a state and the nation were involved, for
the passion and asperity of the exchange, and for the conspicuous
brilliance and learning on both sides. Marshall's genius for
argument is also on display for students to see as is the passionate
side of his personality, which we do not often see. Eleven brilliant
essays in less than four pressure-filled months should also remove
doubts raised by some that Marshall could not have turned out
some of his great opinions so quickly without the help of others."
However, what comes through most profoundly in his final
essay and indeed in all of his essays, is that Marshall spoke as a
Burkean conservative (or as much of one as American
circumstances allowed).
He was repelled by reductionist
abstractions as well as abstract idealism, even when it was
couched, as was much of southern constitutionalism, in terms of a
mythical past. He worked from the "given," accepted the world as
it was, and relished "the disorder of experience," to borrow a
phrase from Charles Rosen. 96 This included the federal system
created by the founders. The doctrine of divided sovereignty,
which Marshall set forth in McCulloch and tried to explain to
Virginians in 1819, was grounded in the complex structure of
state-federal relations in the early republic. It is fashionable, of
course, to emphasize the great moments of conflict between the
states and nation in this system-and there were many. But as
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Leonard White showed many years ago, one of the truly great
accomplishments of the early republic was the fact that it worked
out, both institutionally and in practice, a system of state-national
cooperation which touched almost all areas of government,
including public finance, tax collection, exports and imports, and a
working relationship between federal and state judiciaries (as
outlined by Article III of the Constitution, the Judiciary Act of
1789 and the Federal Process Acts of the 1790s). 7 Even Congress,
whose authority was so much the issue in McCulloch, was
inseparable from the states. The federal electorate, to start with,
was keyed to state election laws. State legislatures elected federal
Senators who were expected to represent the state interests.
House delegations did the same. Senators and Representatives
also roomed together in Washington, consolidating even further
their state and regional outlook. Even the Justices of the Supreme
Court, in the age of circuit riding, were expected to be conversant
with the interests of their own states and sections. 98
Marshall's theory of divided sovereignty rested on this kind of
experiential reality. It was a view of constitutional federalism
built not just on peaceful coexistence of the state and national
governments, but on mutual cooperation between the two.
Banking was a case in point. Judged by the hostile standoff
between state banks and the national bank in 1819, wherein
flagrant mismanagement of the BUS contributed to equally
flagrant mismanagement of state banks, the story was not pretty
to be sure. But state banks had in fact grown and prospered for
twenty years under the supervising management of the First BUS,
and they would do so again after 1823 when the Bank, under the
presidency of Nicholas Biddle, once again operated on sound
principles of management.99 State banks and the Bank of the
United States could peacefully and profitably coexist and, indeed,
had done so in Virginia. The Richmond branch of the Second BUS
was not only managed by Virginians, but also, if Marshall is to be
believed, by members of the Virginia state banking establishment
itself. McCulloch was not designed to destroy state banks, then,
but to keep states (or, as Marshall would have said, state
politicians) from destroying the national bank. State-federal
cooperative banking was not a tidy arrangement, but it had
worked well for a long time and could do so again. This was

97. See generally LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1789-1801 (1948) (detailing the establishment of

the government of the United States and the role of the Federalists in the
process).
98. See generally JAMES S. YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY, 1800-

1828 (1966) (discussing the boardinghouse phenomenon in Washington, D.C.).
99. See generally THOMAS P. MCGOVERN, NICHOLAS BIDDLE: NATIONALIST

AND PUBLIC BANKER, 1786-1844 (1959).

The John Marshall Law Review

[33:875

Marshall's assumption and that of most states as well, including
Maryland.100
What was true in regard to state banking was also true in
regard to the vast apparatus of state mercantilism that existed in
the early republic. State law touched the lives of Americans much
more extensively than did federal law, including, as scholars have
shown, an extensive body of promotive and regulatory economic
legislation.' ° Marshall's decision in McCulloch, despite the hue
and cry raised by Virginia, left this vast area of state power largely
untouched, including southern state-regulation of slavery. What
the states could not do, according to Marshall's constitutional
jurisprudence, was destroy the still shaky structure of national
government or defeat the intention of national laws passed by a
government in which they were abundantly represented as states.
McCulloch did not mandate a national bank, as, for example, the
modern Court mandated a one-man one-vote system in Baker v.
Carr,' but only authorized Congress to create a national bank if it
decided to do so. To put it another way, Marshall, in the spirit of
deferential government, trusted the freely elected representatives
of the people to do the right thing; Virginia democrats attempted
to deny them the opportunity.
Indeed, trust was the fundamental point on which Marshall
and Roane parted company. Marshall saw both judicial and
congressional power in terms of eighteenth century deference; the
officials of the government were expected to govern because they
were presumed to be honest and able. The problem was that the
American people, whom he trusted to elect men they trusted, were
themselves not in a trusting mood. The more they felt the
transformative consequences of the market revolution, the more
distrustful they became, and the more they liked the reductionist
solutions offered up by demagogic politicians.
Marshall's
moderate nationalism and his moderate conservatism gradually
yielded the high ground to the states' rights radicals like John
Randolph, John Taylor, and John C. Calhoun. History, which
Marshall hoped to control with institutions, was out of control. In
a decade and a half, the Bank, whose existence he upheld in 1819,
would be dead: the victim of Jackson's wrath, the political
incompetence of Nicholas Biddle, and ambitions of laissez-faire
minded state capitalists. Marshall's doctrine of implied powers

100. See generally HAMMOND, supra note 13 (discussing the interwoven role

of banking and nationalism).
101. On the vast domain of state economic activity in the antebellum United
States, see generally OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:
MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (1947), and LouIs HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND
DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948).
102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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along with other aspects of his moderate nationalism would be
shelved or modified by the Jacksonian Court under Roger Taney.
Rather than strengthen the federal union, McCulloch, despite
Marshall's valiant effort to explain and defend it, set in motion the
forces that would weaken nationalism and ultimately force the
nation to defend itself on the field of battle. Ironically, the only
thing that survived the conflict set in motion by McCulloch was
the Court's power of judicial review. It is because of this unlikely
victory that we must now turn to complete the story of Marshall's
running war with his own state and with nineteenth century
history.
III. DEFENDING (AND DEFINING) JuDICIAL REVIEW
On September 1, 1831, John C. Calhoun wrote Virgil Maxcy
concerning the Marshall Court:
The question is in truth between the people & the Supreme Court.
We contend, that the great conservative principle of our system is in
the people of the States, as parties to the Constitutional compact,
and our opponents that it is in
10 3 the Supreme Court. This is the sum
total of the whole difference.

At the time Calhoun wrote this, South Carolina was putting his
theory of nullification to the test, and his colleague, Senator
Hayne, was defending his theory of the Constitution as a contract
against Daniel Webster in the soon-to-be famous Webster-Hayne
debate. In the course of a decade of constitutional wrangling over
McCulloch, the Court and the Chief Justice found themselves in
the eye of the storm. Invariably, policy questions turned into
constitutional issues that pitted the states against the nation and
coalesced states into regional alignments. The final question was
not just what the Constitution said about the location of power in
the federal system, but how constitutional disputes should be
resolved. Calhoun's theory of nullification, building on the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, put the states at the center of
the interpretive process. The chore of defending and, indeed,
defining the Court's role fell on Marshall's shoulders, as the chief
interpreter of the Constitution.
Which brings us back to
McCulloch-this time with a focus not on the powers of Congress
but on the position of the Court in American government.
McCulloch is not generally seen as a major judicial review
case, but it is exactly that, providing we see judicial review in the
proper light.' 4 Judicial review was not the creation of any great
moment or single case. Not even, as we have seen, the famous
103. See generally supra, note 9.

104. I define judicial review as the authority of the Court to void acts of
states that conflict with the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties, or to

strike down acts of Congress that conflict with the Constitution.
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case of Marbury v. Madison"' clearly delineated the perimeters of
judicial review. Rather, the authority of the Supreme Court, as
the chief expounder of the Constitution, grew incrementally,
starting
with
the
Constitution
itself and developing
simultaneously (and often in response to) the changing
configuration of Congress and the executive. In this long period of
gestation, McCulloch (as critics of the case were quick to observe)
occupied a pivotal position. Both his theory of divided sovereignty
and continued emphasis on the Constitution as a body of general
principles rather than a code of law, doubtless, account for
McCulloch's centrality. By refusing to locate sovereignty with
finality (as states' rights theorists did), Marshall made judicial
review part of an on-going process of interpretation. Or, to put it
another way, since there was no bright line that separated state
and national power and since general constitutional principles
would have to be applied case-by-case to "the various crises of
human affairs,"" 6 judicial interpretation was built into the
constitutional process. Marshall wisely did not expand on the
point, but he promised in no uncertain terms that the Court would
preside impartially over the process-even if it meant holding acts
of Congress unconstitutional. 7
Judging by the way Marshall resolved the uncertainty in
McCulloch (again as his critics perceived), judicial review
unavoidably evolved into constitutional exposition; it is, a priori, a
reasoned justification for saying yes or no to requests for power
from Congress or the states, which draws on textual
interpretation, history, and policy. Constitutional exposition was
Marshall's hallmark: "the grand style," as Karl Llewellyn would
later call it, was more of a state paper than a judicial opinion in
the ordinary sense of the word. Expounding on the meaning of the
Constitution (rather than simply 'settling' disputes) signaled the
emergence of the Court as an educational institution no less
impressive than the president's bully pulpit and considerably more
in Marshall's case because no less than six different presidents
were in power during the course of his tenure. Adding to the
Court's authority was the simple fact that what it said carried
with it not only the force of words, but also the force of law
(assuming the president backed it up with the power of the
state). °8

105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

106. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
107. For the developmental nature of judicial review, see generally
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986).
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All this appeared to turn the Court into a sitting
constitutional convention, and McCulloch was the classic case-inpoint. Marshall did in McCulloch what he only adumbrated in
Marbury. Judicial review now applied to all acts of Congress and
not just those dealing with the judiciary. In one opinion, Marshall
told Congress what it could do, and, with equal force, he told the
states what they could not do. Moreover, since the case came up
under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it also involved the
exercise of final appellate authority over the decisions of the state
supreme courts. Building on early cases of review as it did,
Marshall's opinion looked like a carefully planned conspiracy to
aggrandize the Supreme Court at the expense of its interpretive
rivals: Congress, state legislatures, and state courts.
Virginia critics of Marshall's opinion were quick to focus on its
expansive implications for judicial review. Had Marshall used the
Section 25 power to strike down the act of Congress, there would
have been no complaints, and antebellum history might have been
considerably different. Rather, both Congress and the Court
strengthened their power, and since both were agents of the
national government, it seemed like a double barreled conspiracy
against the states. Marshall emerged as the chief conspirator.
For his critics, he stood as the evil genius who first went out of his
way and beyond the scope of his authority to reach the decision in
the first place and then bamboozled his colleagues into going along
with the usurpation. This was Jefferson's position, and it was also
Roane's and Brockenbrough's.
Both men (with Jefferson's
encouragement) set out to humble Marshall and the Court.
The public assault on the judicial review dimension of
McCulloch began in the first "Amphictyon" essay. In his essay,
Brockenbrough condemned the Justices for not writing opinions
seriatim-a tradition he claimed was of special importance "on
this great constitutional question, affecting very much the rights
of the several states composing our confederacy," °9 and especially
since the decision "abrogated the law of one state, and is supposed
to have formed a rule for the future conduct of other states."110
Brockenbrough followed Jefferson on this point and again when he
accused Marshall of traveling "out of the record to decide a point
not necessarily growing out of it.""' Brockenbrough also preached
the constitutional gospel according to the third resolution of
Madison's Report, which assailed the power of the Court to rule

WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS
OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 247-74 (1984) for a thorough

examination of the cultural resonance of each section of Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch.
109. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 53.
110. Id. at 53-54.
111. Id. at 155.
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with finality on questions regarding the powers of the states as
"parties to the Constitutional compact.""'
Roane continued the direct assault against the Court in his
first essay, arguing not just that Marshall's interpretation of the
Constitution was wrong but that he lacked authority to interpret it
at all. As Roane saw it, Marshall's whole opinion was "a judicial
coup de main."' The Justices "have gone out of the record," he
claimed, but by not attending to the 10th Amendment, they have
completely misread "necessary and proper," and, indeed, have
"expunged those words from the constitution."" 4 Great as it may
be, Roane concluded the "power of the supreme court.., does not
extend to everything; it is not great enough to change the
constitution.""' Not only did the opinion expand the powers of
Congress "'to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever,"' it expanded
the authority of the Court to rule in all cases whatsoever,
even
6
those involving the powers of the sovereign states.1
In Roane's "Hampden" Essay IV, he returned again to the
theme of judicial usurpation, picking up on Brockenbrough's
earlier reference to Madison's "celebrated report of 1799."" 1
Madison's point there was that the Court's powers, whatever they
might be, do not and cannot "be raised above the authority of the
sovereign parties to the constitution," who are, the states
themselves."'
Such a power "would annul the authority
delegating it, and its concurrence in usurpation, might subvert,
forever, that constitution which all were interested to preserve.""9
To support this principle further, Roane turned to his own opinion
"in the case of Hunter v. Fairfax" 2' in which the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals denied the Supreme Court's appellate authority
over state decisions under Section 25. Since state judiciaries had
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to try federal questions,
this would be to make the states themselves final judges of the
constitutionality of their own acts. Roane also cited the "state of
Pennsylvania['s] ... case of commonwealth [sic] v. Cobbett" 2 on
this point and quoted extensively from the resolution of the

112. Id. at 64.
113. Id. at 110 (reprinting Roane's "Hampden" I essay).
114. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 110.
115. Id. at 111.
116. Id.at 112.
117. Id.at 148.
118. Id.at 149.
119. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 149.
120. Id. Roane's reference is to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
disposition in the Fairfax land dispute. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1
(1816), rev'd 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
121. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 149. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's

decision in Cobbett is reported in the United States Reporter. See generally
Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (1798).
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Pennsylvania legislature instructing their representatives in
Congress to oppose the re-charter of the First BUS in 1811. The
Pennsylvania resolution of January 11, 1811, declared that the
Constitution "to all intents and purposes" was "a treaty among
sovereign states."" The "general government, by this treaty, was
not constituted the exclusive or final judge of the powers it was to
exercise; for if it were so to judge, then its judgment, and not the
constitution, would be the measure of its authority."2 ' The
Supreme Court, in effect, has claimed "the right ...to change the
government: to convert a federal into a consolidated government.
The supreme court is also pleased to say, that this important right
and duty has been devolved upon it by the constitution.""4 But
nowhere is that power of judicial review stated in the Constitution.
The Constitution "could not give it, without violating a great
principle; and we certainly cannot supply by implication, that
which the convention dared not to express.""' The Constitution
gives the Court the power to decide cases between states, Roane
conceded, but "it has not given to it a jurisdiction over its own
controversies, with a state or states.""6 To have done so would
have made the Court and the national government the final judge
in its own case.
Roane cut to the heart of his dispute with Marshall, but he
also exposed the chink in his own constitutional armor. If, as
Marshall declared, sovereignty was divided between the states and
the national governments, if there was no bright line, and if
federalism cases had to be settled as they came up in constantly
changing circumstances, then whoever had the power to settle the
disputes had the ultimate power in the system. Roane opted for
state power. But there were questions and problems on both sides.
For starters, how, by what method, and according to what
procedures were the states to proceed in resolving disputes over
federalism? Moreover, how can there be one Constitution and one
Union under it if each state gets to say what the Constitution
means? Can a theory of states' rights that claims to be rooted in
the Constitution be taken seriously if it ends up destroying the
Constitution? On the other hand, how can Marshall lodge the
power to interpret the Constitution in the Court, which of all
branches of the government, state or federal, is furthest removed
from the people who are admittedly sovereign? How, on a
practical level, can the Court gain the trust of the states or of
sister branches for that matter? What happens to the law if the
states resist the decisions of the Court? And what if the Justices,
122.
123.
124.
125.
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human beings that they are, err? Does the Court have some
special institutional qualities to minimize the mistakes of its
members and eliminate personal bias or self interest?
Marshall's main effort to answer Roane and clarify and justify
the true meaning of judicial review came in Cohens v. Virginia."7
But first, he opened his defense of judicial review in the debate
over McCulloch. In his first "A Friend to the Union" essay, he
confronted Brockenbrough's charge that the Justices had
abandoned seriatim opinions and surrendered to the dominance of
the Chief Justice. "The opinion is delivered," Marshall said,
referring to McCulloch, "not in the name of the chief justice, but in
the name of the whole court," and this applied to the reasoned
justification of the opinion as well as its conclusion. 12 8 Moreover,

Marshall continued, the author of the Court's opinion "never
speaks in the singular number, or in his own person, but as the
mere organ of the court. In the presence of all the judges, and in
their names he advances certain propositions as their propositions,
and certain reasoning as their reasoning."'29 Then he asks
Amphictyon (and his readers) "whether the judges of the Supreme
Court, men of high and respectable character,... sit by in silence,

while great constitutional principles of which they disapproved,
were advanced in their name, and as their principles."' 0 Rather,
[tihe opinion which is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is
previously submitted to the consideration of all the judges; and, if
any part of the reasoning be disapproved, it must be so modified as
to receive the approbation of all, before it can be delivered as the
opinion of all.'2 '
Judges can join the majority opinion for their own reasons, and
they can dissent if they want. But one way or another (and here
the Court differed fundamentally from Congress), each judge
accepts responsibility for the Court's decision. Moreover, since
"their decisions are reported and are in the possession of the
publick [sic]," each opens his work to public scrutiny.' The Court
may look aristocratic, as critics maintain, but in the final analysis,
it is more open and responsible than its rivals-or so Marshall
argued.
In addressing Brockenbrough's charge that McCulloch was
entirely obiter dictum, Marshall replied that his discussion about
the nature of the Union was in direct response to arguments of
counsel. As to the allegedly unavoidable national bias in the
Supreme Court's opinions regarding federalism, Marshall only
127. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
128. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 80.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 80.

20001

Southern States' Rights Tradition

alluded to what he spelled out elsewhere: the Court was bound
and kept honest by the intent of the framers. 3 Marshall's final
effort to discredit Amphictyon, delivered in "A Friend to the
Union" II, was a subtle jab at Brockenbrough for rousing the
people against the Court, which was merely doing its
constitutional duty, and for assailing the Court because it "is less
popular, and therefore more vulnerable" than the other branches
of government." Neither argument carried much weight in postMcCulloch Virginia, but Marshall made a point dear to his heart:
that the whole assault on the Court was a cowardly affair
perpetrated by a new class of ambitious politicians who were
turning their back on Virginia's history.
Marshall amplified this line of defense in his first response to
Roane on June 30, 1819. Here, he repeated his Hamiltonian
argument about the Court's institutional vulnerability to popular
prejudice. Not only is it "without power, without patronage,
without the legitimate means of ingratiating itself with the
people," but its work, by its "intricate and abstruse" nature, is3
hard to understand and can easily "be grossly misrepresented."'9

To attack the Court while attacking its decisions, was, in short, all
but irresistible to Virginia states' rights supporters, especially
since attacking the Court amounted to assailing "the very
existence of the [national] government."' 3 It was this point-that
the very existence of the Constitution depended on the Court's
powers of judicial review-that Marshall would make his main
line of defense against Spencer Roane in Cohens.
The Roane-Marshall exchange over the nature of the Supreme
Court in McCulloch was a warm up for the main bout. It was a
punch and counterpunch with no knockout blows on either side.
Roane depicted the Court as a special engine of oppression.
Marshall responded that the Court was adhering "to those
American principles" set forth in the Constitution, which imposed
on it "the duty, of preserving the constitution as the permanent
law of the land."" 7 Roane claimed that the Court had traveled
outside the record to do its dirty work. Marshall, referring to the
obligatory jurisdiction imposed on it by Article III of the
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789, denied that it "had
thrust itself into the controversy between the United States and
the state of Maryland" or that it had "unnecessarily volunteered
its services." 3 " This is how it went, with the exchange becoming
more heated and more personal as it progressed.
133. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 81-85.
134. Id. at 104.
135. Id. at 156.
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Perhaps the most important and prophetic exchange took
place over the Court's jurisdiction in cases involving the rights of
states-a bitterly contested point, which went back to Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee and beyond. Marshall delivered a couple of sharp
ad hominem jabs in answering Roane, but mainly he took the high
ground of Federalist constitutional theory. Roane's mistake was
his assumption that the Supreme Court was a creature of the
national government, when, in reality, it was the creation of the
written Constitution which emanated from the American people in
solemn convention. The Court was not a "partial, local tribunal"
(presumably like the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on which
Roane sat), but a tribunal "erected by the people of the United
States" for "the decision of all national questions."'3 9 It was true
that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied this authority
in Hunter v.Martin, with Roane speaking. But it was also true
that this was "the only example furnished by any court in the
union of a sentiment favorable to that 'hydra in government, from
which,' says the Federalist, 'nothing but contradiction and
confusion can proceed.""" Marshall's main point, however, was
that Hunter "was reversed by the unanimous decision of the
Supreme Court" in Martin, which has not been disapproved by any
other state court even though they had many opportunities to do
so. 4 1 Indeed, "[i]n every instance, except that of Hunter and
Fairfax, the judgment of reversal has been acquiesced in, and the
jurisdiction of the [supreme] court has been recognized." "2 To put
the matter in the most personal way, which Marshall clearly
delighted in doing:
If the most unequivocal indications of the public sentiment may be
trusted, it is not hazarding much to say, that, out of Virginia, there
is probably not a single judge, nor a single lawyer of eminence, who
does not dissent from the principles
laid down by the court of
14 3
appeals in Hunter and Fairfax.

Thus, the debate, which began over the scope of congressional
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, turned into a
struggle between lawyers, indeed, between judges, and between
courts. The personal, political, and professional rivalry between
Marshall and Roane was also deeply rooted in Virginia history and
instructive on that count. Both men descended from elite Virginia
families and consolidated their social and economic standing by
marrying into the first family network. Both served in the
Virginia House of Delegates in the 1780s (though on opposite sides

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id at 203.
Id. at 205-06.
Id.
Id. at 205.

143. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 205.

20001

Southern States' Rights Tradition

of that decade's political divisions), and both served on the
governor's council. Roane's legal education was more formal than
Marshall's, but both men studied law with George Wythe at
William and Mary. They probably even knew one another since
Roane graduated in 1780, while Marshall attended the Wythe
lectures in the summer of that year. Both men studied the same
books, entered the legal profession in the 1780s, and shared the
basic assumptions of Virginia legal culture. The difference was
that Roane never cut his ties with that culture and Marshall didnot by repudiating it, but by applying what Virginia taught him to
the governance of the nation.
From the 1780s onward, Roane identified with "the genius of
Virginia," as his future father-in-law put it at the Virginia
ratifying convention. As a supporter of the states' rights party in
the 1790s, Roane found himself in opposition to Marshall on
almost all the great issues of that passionate decade-not just
political issues but legal ones, too. Roane and Marshall first
crossed swords as lawyers in the 1780s, but the legal rivalry,
which climaxed in Cohens, began in earnest when Roane became a
state judge, first on the General Court (the primary trial court in
Virginia) then, until his death in 1822, as a member of the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. As a state judge, Roane's
opposition to Marshall was both personal and institutional. As a
member of the state judiciary, he ruled consistently against the
Marshall syndicate in the protracted Fairfax litigation (a fact
which Marshall noted with asperity)."
Roane was a member of
the Supreme Court of Appeals, which voted to uphold the Virginia
statute of escheats of 1777 that finally defeated the claims of the
syndicate at the state level. When the United States Supreme
Court reversed that decision on a Section 25 writ of error in
Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,' Roane's court retaliated in
Hunter v. Martin, which denied the Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review state court decisions under Section 25. The opinion, in
turn, generated Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, in which Justice Story,
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court (and with the
enthusiastic approval of Marshall), reaffirmed the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over state courts under Section
25, even in cases involving state common law." 6
144. For an in-depth discussion of the long history of the Fairfax litigation,
see generally John A Treon, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee: A Case History (1970)

(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with the author).
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litigation, see Charles Hobson, Editorial Note, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, at 108-21. See also G. EDWARD WHITE & GERALD GUNTHER, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 165-73 (1988). For an
excellent brief treatment of Roane and Virginia legal culture, see generally
TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATES JUDGES
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Inseparable' from the long personal and professional rivalry
between the two men was the rivalry between the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United
States. Ironically, the Virginia Court was, as noted, among the
first in the nation to claim the power of judicial review. Marshall
was familiar with those cases, admired the judges who handed
down the opinions, and used both the men and the opinions as
models. Roane employed the same tradition to strengthen the
Supreme Court of Appeals' state judiciary-not only in his
opinions but in his effort to persuade his colleagues to abandon
seriatim opinions. By the time Roane challenged Marshall over
McCulloch, he was the dominant voice on the Virginia high court
and the leading spokesman for Virginia's legal community. Their
confrontation in Cohens v. Virginia was the climactic struggle
between two of Virginia's sharpest legal minds and between two
rival constitutional traditions both deeply rooted in Virginia
history.47
The dispute over Section 25 jurisdiction in Cohens was
perfectly calculated to join the issue between the two courts and
the two judges. It was also an issue central to antebellum history.
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed the Supreme Court
to "reverse or affirm" decisions from the highest state courts on
federal questions where the right claimed under the Constitution,
federal law, or treaties, was denied. Since federal questions were
routinely heard in state courts, the right of review provided by
Section 25 was absolutely essential; unless, of course, it was
desired that each state, via the interpretations of its own courts,
should have its own version of the Constitution. If Section 25 was
necessary for a unitary Constitution, it was also, in its wording
and operation, unavoidably demeaning to state courts, judges, and
lawyers. The writ of error itself, in its ancient common law
lineage, was a writ issued by a superior to an inferior court for the
purposes of correcting errors of law made at the lower level.
Customarily drawn by the party appealing the state decisions, the
writ could be activated by the approval of a single Supreme Court
justice, and, once issued, it demanded, peremptorily, that the state
court supply all the appropriate records of the decision in question.
In effect, one justice could call the highest court of the state before
the bar of the Supreme Court to defend itself. In fact, it was by
means of Section 25 jurisdiction that the Marshall Court set itself
up to overturn both state statutes and the state court decisions
interpreting them. Among those cases were Fletcher v. Peck, "

AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890 10-39 (1999).

147. For a discussion of Roane's influence on the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, see generally HUEBNER, supranote 146.
148. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 187 (1810).
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Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, " 9 (and, of course, Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee itself), Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"' Ogden
In fact, most of the Court's contract decisions
v. Saunders.'
2
and the
arrived via Section 25. So did Gibbons v. Ogden"1
controversial bankruptcy cases of Sturges v. Crowinshield"'.and
Ogden v. Saunders. So would the Cherokee Indian cases in the
1830s.'"4
McCulloch was also a Section 25 case, providing Roane with
the opportunity to once again challenge Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
which he was obviously hankering to do. Marshall, it should be
noted, was involved in the Martin v. Hunter's Lessee controversy,
even though he had formally recused himself from the case. Since
he was the dominant figure on the Court and was also close to
Story, who wrote the opinion, it is not unreasonable to assume
that Story had consulted with Marshall and perhaps, given the
intimate living arrangements of the Court, other Justices as well.
In fact, Justice Story boasted that the Chief Justice, "approved
every word of the opinion," which has led some scholars to
speculate that Marshall may have helped write it. What is beyond
dispute is that Marshall went to unusual lengths (perhaps even
unethical ones) to bring the case forward. He did not sign the
petition for the issuance of the writ of error, as he would ordinarily
have done had he not recused himself (because the case came from
his judicial circuit). He did, however, as G. Edward White has
shown, draft the petition itself. Perhaps, as White suggests,
Marshall (having recused himself) did this as a private citizen who
was a party to the case."' Or perhaps the embryonic ethical
traditions of recusement at this time permitted him to do so. But
clearly he pushed to the limits, and probably beyond, in an effort
to bring the ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
before his own Court. Virginia did not recognize the Court's power
to issue the writ in the Martin case and, indeed, never
acknowledged having received it. Thus, the seeds were sown that
produced such bitter fruit in Cohens v. Virginia.
The peculiar factual environment and legal issues of Cohens
added fuel to the fire. On one level, it involved a clash between
congressional and state statutory law-not identical to that in
McCulloch but close enough to raise southern hackles. On the
federal side, the Congressional Statute of 1802 organized the

149. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
150. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
151. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1825).

152. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
153. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
154. Cherokee Nations v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
155. WHITE & GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 164-73.
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District of Columbia into "a body politic and corporate""6 and
authorized the sale of lottery tickets to effect "any important
improvements in the City."15 7 On the state side, the Virginia Act of

1820 criminalized the sale of all lottery tickets in the state except
those authorized by the state legislature. The jurisdictional phase
of the case, which quickly overshadowed the conflict between
federal and state statutory law, began when the Cohen brothers,
who were citizens of Virginia and agents for the D.C. lottery, were
convicted and fined $100 in the Norfolk Borough Court for selling
national lottery tickets in defiance of the Virginia law. Upon being
denied appeal to the Superior Court---"inasmuch as cases of this
sort are not subject to revision by any other courts of the
commonwealth"' 5 5-lawyers for the brothers requested a writ of
error from the Supreme Court reviewing the Hustings Court
decision. The writ was issued and accompanied, as was customary
in such cases, by notice to the Governor and Attorney General of
Virginia, summoning the state to defend itself before the bar of the
Supreme Court.
The significance of the case was clear from the outset, so
much so that some (contemporaries and historians alike) felt that
the case was contrived to give Marshall another shot at Roane and
company. A leading scholar of the Marshall Court concludes that
there is no convincing evidence establishing the feigned nature of
the litigation.159 Nevertheless, the appearance of a joint letter in
the nationalist Niles' Weekly Register by five leading members of
the Supreme Court bar supporting the Cohen brothers (only one
day after they petitioned for a writ of error) raised unanswered
questions. Shortly after these national-minded lawyers pounced
on the case, states' rights supporters responded in the Richmond
Enquirer with their own account. Their essays attacked Marshall
and the Court for its nationalizing doctrines and restated old
arguments about state sovereignty and the compact nature of the
Constitution. But what really concerned them was the Court's
appellate authority under Section 25, which they vehemently
rejected. This was the main thrust of Roane's editorials, and it
was the position taken by the Virginia legislature, which
instructed counsel for Virginia to argue only the jurisdictional
question in Cohens. By the time the Court decided the case, the
newspaper war had spread to the Washington papers and beyond.
Whether the case was feigned or not did not matter, since both
sides, still in battle formation after McCulloch, were anxious for a
156. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 269.
157. Id. at 285.
158. WHITE & GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 507 (quoting the Richmond
Enquirer).
159. WHITE & GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 504-524 (providing a full and
scholarly account of the Cohens case).
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final showdown. The American people awaited the outcome. 6 °
Whether the American people fully understood Marshall's
complex opinion, however, is doubtful; though, on one level, it was
as straightforward as it was unoriginal. The main points decided
were these: that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act was constitutional
(which was hardly surprising after Martin v. Hunter's Lessee).
Additionally, it applied to this case regardless of the 11th
Amendment, which Virginia argued protected the state from being
hauled before the Supreme Court by private citizens, and despite
the fact that the case came directly to the Supreme Court from the
Norfolk Borough Court, rather than from the highest court in the
state, as the literal reading of Section 25 requires.
The
significance of the opinion was in both the details of Marshall's
argument and his memorable language. Cohens was one of
Marshall's most eloquent and quotable opinions. In some ways it
was also the most tedious and tendentious, which is not surprising
since it was Marshall's definitive answer to Roane and161 Virginia
states' rights lawyers on the Court's appellate authority.
Were it not for Marshall's determination to answer Roane and
the States' rights supporters conclusively, the case might have
been resolved quietly. Certainly, there was plenty of room for
maneuvering and ample reason to downplay the conflict between
Virginia and Congress as well as Virginia and the Court. There is
even some doubt as to whether a federal question was involved at
all, which is necessary to activate Section 25. For example, the
Congressional Act of 1802, under which the Cohen brothers
claimed the right to sell lottery tickets in Virginia, was clearly
limited to the governance of the newly created District of
Columbia. To be sure, the Cohen brothers claimed that the law
authorized them to sell tickets in Virginia, but the more restricted
reading of the statute was readily available to Marshall. A
restrictive (that is to say, non-confrontational) reading of that act
appears all the more reasonable when it is recalled that the
Virginia law in question appeared to come under the general
category of police power legislation-the authority that states
were assumed to possess by all (including Marshall), which
allowed them to legislate for the general well-being of the people of
the state. Laws governing lotteries could readily be seen as
legislation within the police powers of the state. But in any case,
the statute under which the Cohen brothers were convicted was a
160. For a discussion of the Court's Approach to Cohens, see 1 WARREN,
supra note 95, at 541-64. For Marshall's reaction to Roane's charge that
Cohens was "feigned," see John Marshall to Henry Wheaton (June 2, 1821), in
9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 150.
161. For an admirable discussion of the issues addressed in Cohens, see
Charles Hobson, Editorial Introduction, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL,
at 106-13.
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criminal law, the ultimate in local laws, and one heretofore exempt
from Section 25 review. The wording of both Section 25 and the
11th Amendment presented problems for the Cohen brothers and
provided discretionary latitude for Marshall. First, Section 25
provided for appeal only from the highest court in the state. This
condition was not met by the facts in Cohens. Regarding the 11th
Amendment, there was a real question whether the Cohen
brothers were suing the state at all (such suits were prohibited by
the 11th Amendment) since they were appealing a criminal
conviction brought against them by the state. To uphold the
Court's jurisdiction, Marshall would, then, have to read Section 25
broadly and the 11th Amendment narrowly. He did both with
persuasive force. But the fact remains that the interpretive play
in the statute and the amendment would have allowed him to go
the other way had he chosen to do so. These are the shades of
Marbury.
Why then did he decide to take on Virginia and by what
means, to what end, and with what consequences? Marshall's
most conspicuously legalistic constitutional opinion was also his
most political, and no doubt, the two aspects of his opinion were
very much connected. Although he had a plausible, legal way out
of the case, circumstances beyond his control left him little real
choice. By the time the case reached the Court, it had become so
thoroughly politicized that not responding to it would have
appeared to be capitulation. Not only had the political press of
Virginia challenged the Court openly, but the Virginia legislature
had joined the fray with its instructions to counsel. There was no
doubt in Marshall's mind that Jefferson had put his imprimatur
on the proceedings, and there was the Roane rivalry to contend
with as well. "Hampden" had been answered in the papers, to be
sure, but the Court itself had yet to officially address the on-going
challenge of Virginia jurists concerning the Supreme Court's
Moreover, the danger was spreading.
appellate authority.
National newspapers, for the first time in history, devoted
coverage to the debate over McCulloch and could be expected to do
the same with Cohens. More serious was the escalating struggle
between Ohio and the Court over the Bank decision in the pending
case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States,6 which challenged
the authority of the Court to enforce its decision in McCulloch
under Section 25. As he made clear to Story, Marshall viewed the
widespread challenge to the jurisdiction as a challenge to the
Union itself.6 ' Circumstances called for a definitive answer to
Roane the lawyer, Jefferson the politician, and to states right

162. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
163. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1821), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 184.
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theorists wherever they were. 164
Cohens was fashioned for the crisis at hand, but it was also
vintage Marshall: both in its language (which radiated
impartiality and reason) and carefully planned rhetorical strategy
(wherein self-evident and unprovable generalizations preceded
lawyerly "proof"). The Chief Justice rhetorically opened by
restating the arguments made by the counsel of Virginia:
They maintain that the nation does not possess a department
capable of restraining, peaceably, and by authority of law, any
attempts which may be made, by a part, against the legitimate
powers of the whole; and that the government is reduced to the
alternative of submitting to such attempts, or of resisting them by
force. They maintain the constitution of the United States has
provided no tribunal for the final construction of itself, or of the laws
in the
or treaties of the nation; but that this power may be exercised
165
last resort by the Courts of every State in the Union.
To quote, Marshall assumed, was to damn; and to state
Virginia's arguments in their baldest form was to signal what the
Court's response would be. That response, the Chief Justice
assured his readers, stemmed not from the Court's aggrandizing
power but from its sense of legal and moral obligation. The words,
which he invited his readers to read through republican-colored
glasses, were familiar ones to Court watchers:
If such be the constitution, it is the duty of the court to bow with
respectful submission to its provisions. If such be not the
constitution, it is equally the duty of this Court to say so; and to
the American people have assigned to the
perform that task which
166
judicial department.

The message was that the law-not judges-ruled, and the
Supreme Court, despite the charges of aristocracy levelled against
it, derived its authority (no less than did the political branches)
from the sovereign people speaking, as only they could speak, in a
written Constitution.
Having put the Court's and his own republican honor on the
line, Marshall abruptly turned to Virginia's objections to the
Court's assertion of jurisdiction under Section 25. He might have
confronted that section directly, but instead, (following the logic of
Justice Story's argument in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee) Marshall
decided to rest his case first on the text of the Constitution,
164. Marshall anticipated a showdown over Cohens as early as February

1821 and expressed his desire to Bushrod Washington "that the court be as
full as possible when it is decided." Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod
Washington (Feb. 8, 1821), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 101. For
Marshall's response to the Virginia reaction, see Letter from John Marshall to
Joseph Story (June 15, 1821), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 167-68.
165. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 377.
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particularly Articles III and VI. Virginia claimed that a "sovereign
independent state" could not be sued against its will: Article III
granted the federal courts jurisdiction over cases in which the
state was a party. Indeed, by ratifying the Constitution, "it shall
appear that the state has submitted to be sued, then it has parted
with this sovereign right of judging, in every case on the justice of
its own pretension, and has entrusted that power to a tribunal in
whose impartiality it confides."1 67 That impartial tribunal is the
Supreme Court. And why, Marshall asked, did the states entrust
that power to the Supreme Court? Because, he said, in oft quoted
words:
The American states, as well as the American people, have believed
a close and firm Union to be essential to their liberty and to their
happiness. They have been taught by experience, that this union
cannot exist, without a government for the whole; and they have
been taught by the same experience that this government would be
a mere shadow, that must disappoint all their hopes, unless
invested with large portions of that sovereignty which belongs to
independent States. Under the influence of this opinion, and thus
instructed by experience, the American people, in the conventions
of
168
their respective States, adopted the present constitution.
In addition to being eloquent and quotable rhetoric, this brief
passage was central to Marshall's argument. First, it established,
by the authority of the written text of the Constitution, the general
principle that states could be sued and that the Supreme Court
could hear such suits. In addition, it permitted him to discourse
again on the theory of divided sovereignty that he had expounded
in McCulloch and in the newspaper war with Roane and
Brockenbrough.
In those earlier discussions, Marshall aimed to refute the
"consolidationist" accusation and to downplay the powers of the
national government (even while he was enlarging them through
implied powers). In Cohens, he emphasized the "supremacy" of the
national government-a word he used several times in two
paragraphs. Sovereignty was still divided between nation and the
states, to be sure, but his emphasis was now on Article VI, which
made federal law supreme over state law.
This [Article] is the authoritative language of the American people;
and, if gentlemen please, of the American states. It marks, with
lines too strong to be mistaken, the characteristic distinction
between the government of the union, and those of the States. The
general government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme
with respect to those objects. This principle is part of the
constitution; and if there be any who deny its necessity, none can

167. Id. at 380.
168. Id. at 380-81.
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deny its authority.

169

Thus far, two principles essential to the Court's powers had
been set forth. First, the Court's powers reside in the text of the
Constitution, which had been agreed to, not only by the American
people, but by the states themselves. Second, the portion of
sovereignty granted to the national government was (again by the
authority of the text of the Constitution) supreme. The third
principle, which followed logically from the first two, concerned the
appellate powers of the Supreme Court. If the Constitution is
supreme, if it created a national government which is supreme in
its granted sphere of powers, and if the Court is granted the power
to try constitutional cases coming from state courts, then it too, in
these cases is supreme. It is literally the Supreme Court of the
The purpose of the Court, according to the
United States.
was "the maintenance of these principles in
Constitution itself,
70
their purity."1
The Supreme Court is authorized to decide all cases of every
description, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is
made for cases in which a state may be a party. When we consider
the unique relationship between the federal and state
governments, the nature of the Constitution in which state
governments are subordinate to the federal, and the great purpose
for which Section 25 jurisdiction over cases arising under the
constitution and laws of the United States is confided to the
judicial department, then the question remains. Are we at liberty
to insert into this general grant an exception for those cases in
which a state may be a party? Will the spirit of the Constitution
justify this attempt to control its words?
In the course of justifying the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall
defined the Supreme Court's role in sweeping republican
language. Its domain was constitutional principle, and in the
spirit and language of the Constitution, it was the keeper of the
flame. He went on to argue in incendiary language (to Virginia, at
least) that the Court was uniquely suited to this high purpose,
especially when compared to state judiciaries. It was a matter of
historical fact, he continued, that "[d]ifferent states may entertain
different opinions on the true construction of the constitutional
powers of Congress," and "States may legislate in conformity to
their opinions, and may enforce those opinions by penalties."'
Then, turning to state courts (with an eye on Spencer Roane and
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals), Marshall continued: "It
would be hazarding too much to assert, that the judicatures of the

169. Id. at 381-82.
170. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 382.
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States will be exempt from the prejudices by which the
legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute
perfectly impartial tribunals."172 This was especially true since
judges in many states "are dependent for office and for salary, on
the will of the legislature."" 3 The Constitution cannot be placed in
the keeping of such institutions:
j
[It] is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its
course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and
tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they
have not provided it, as far as its nature will permit, with the means
of self-preservation from the perils it may be destined to encounter.
No government ought to be so defective in its organization, as not to
contain within itself the means of securing the execution of its17 4own
laws against other dangers than those which occur every day.
The federal judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its head, was the
means that the framers chose to secure the execution of its own
laws "and of preserving them from all violation, from every
quarter, so far as judicial decisions can preserve them ....,'
There are no references in this opening statement to either
Section 25 or the 11th Amendment, and one must assume that for
rhetorical reasons Marshall opened, instead, with a simple
proposition: the American people themselves created the Supreme
Court to serve as the special guardian of the Constitution and the
federal union, itself, as against the states. To drive home this
point he argued further (taking his cue from Story's expansive and
much contested opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee), that even
without Section 25, Article III of the Constitution established the
Court's authority as the final interpreter and protector. Virginia
argued that Article III suits against the state could come only
under original jurisdiction, which was not the case in Cohens.
Marshall countered in fourteen pages of intricate argumentation
that Article III was intended to cover all contingencies, including
those in Cohens. Nowhere was his rhetoric, legal logic, or
interpretive skill more forcefully displayed-or his contempt for
Virginia theorists-than in these pages. He admitted that most
suits involving states would come under original jurisdiction, but
he insisted that states could also be sued under appellate
jurisdiction, provided that the subject matter in the case involved
a question of constitutional or federal law:
The truth is, that where the words confer only appellate jurisdiction,
original jurisdiction is most clearly not given; but where the words

172.
173.
174.
175.
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admit of appellate jurisdiction, the power to take cognizance of the
suit originally, does not necessarily negative the power to1 7decide
6
upon it on an appeal, if it may originate in a different Court.
The analysis comes down to a loaded game of chance: heads the
Supreme Court wins, tails Virginia loses. The general rule of
construction is this: "Every part of the article must be taken into
view, and that construction adopted which will consist with its
words, and promote its general intention. The Court may imply a
negative from affirmative words, where the implication promotes,
not where it defeats the intention."77 Virginia's argument that the
Court could not rightfully entertain Cohens because it was an
appellate case brought under Section 25, rather than an original
jurisdiction case, went down in flames.
Having rejected Virginia's interpretation of Article III,
Marshall then turned to Virginia's remaining objections to the
Court's jurisdiction. The first objection centered on the 11th
Amendment, which states: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
citizens of another State .... 178 Arguing this time for a broad
interpretation of the Constitution, Virginia contended that the
amendment was intended, out of respect for the dignity and
sovereignty of the state, to prohibit all suits in federal courts
brought by individuals whether or not they were citizens of other
states or foreign countries. Uncharacteristically, Marshall now
argued for a narrow interpretation. The true meaning of the
amendment, he said, was to be found in the specific problem which
gave rise to it. Specifically, in Chisholm v. Georgia,'79 the problem
related to the fact that Georgia had been sued by citizens of South
Carolina to recover debts against the state. The 11th Amendment,
on both first impression and extended inquiry, was "intended for
those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a
State is made by an individual, in the Courts of the Union." ° He
willingly conceded "a general interest might well be felt in leaving
to a State the full power of consulting its convenience in the
adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it ...."1 On the
other hand, "no interest could be felt in so changing the relations
between the whole and its parts, as to strip the government of the
means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the
constitution and laws from active violation."' But in any case, the
176. Id. at 397-98.
177. Id. at 398.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
179. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
180. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 407.
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amendment didF not apply to cases like Cohens. That case
originated not as a suit by an individual against the state but as
an action brought by the state against an individual and appealed
by him to another court. Appropriately, that court was the
Supreme Court of the United States when the party based his
appeal on the Constitution or a federal law (finally bringing
Marshall to Section 25, which provided precisely for such appeals).
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed by a majority
of the first Congress, made up largely of men who had served in
the Constitutional Convention, was arguably one of the most
important statutes passed by that Congress or any other. Because
it provided appeal from state court interpretations of federal law,
it was the one essential link to national sovereignty. It was the
sine qua non of a unified system of constitutional law. For
precisely that reason, it became the focal point of the struggle
between Virginia and the Marshall Court in 1816 and the starting
point of the states' rights logic of John C. Calhoun after 1823. In
Cohens, Marshall found himself on the front line of a major
constitutional battle and, indeed, on the fault line of a major
constitutional realignment. Virginia premised its position on "the
supposed total separation of the judiciary of a State from that of
the Union, and their entire independence of each other."'83 This
"hypothesis" was, as he correctly perceived, merely another
manifestation of states' rights theory which maintained that the
national government was the mere agent of states who, as parties
to the contract, retained absolute sovereignty. Marshall's theory
of divided sovereignty recognized that states had sovereign powers
that the Court was bound to respect. Now he asked Virginia to
acknowledge those areas in the Constitution which affirmed the
supremacy of the national government and bound Americans
together as a nation.
In his famous words:
[Tihat the United States form, for many, and for most important
purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are
one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial
regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other
respects, the American people are one; and the government which is
alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all
these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their

government, and, in that character, they have no other. America
has chosen to be, in many respects and for many purposes, a nation,
and for all these purposes, her government is complete; to all these
objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the
exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can,
then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or
governments within the American territory. The constitution and
183. Id. at 413.
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the laws of a state, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These states
are constituent parts of the United States; they are members of one
great empire-for some purposes sovereign, and for some purposes
subordinate."4
The doctrine here is familiar, but the words warrant notice
because they display not only Marshall's rhetorical skills, but also
the passion of his convictions. In an age that cherished great
preaching, Marshall was both a great preacher and a great
believer, and in him, the two were inextricably connected. His
peroration also fit his argument. By declaiming on the great
nation-building purpose of the Constitution, he laid an emotional
foundation for his justification of the Court's appellate authority.
The Supreme Court and the nation were bound together, and if the
Court was to do its duty, then the reach of its jurisdiction must
equal the reach of the nation's law.
We think that in a government acknowledgedly supreme, with
respect to the objects of vital interest to the nation, there is nothing
inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the
nature of government, in making all its departments supreme, so far
as respects those objects, and so far as is necessary to their
attainment. The exercise of the appellate power over those
judgments of the state tribunals which may contravene the
constitution or laws of the United States, is, we believe, essential to
the attainment of those objects. 18
It follows inexorably that the Supreme Court, provided for in
Article III, is inseparable from the supreme law, provided for in
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. The founding fathers, wise
from the experience of the Articles period, deliberately made it
that way, and "contemporaneous exposition"186 verified their
intent. Chief among contemporaneous expositions of the intent of
the framers, standing right along side of The Federalist, was the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and most particularly Section 25.
Given the centrality of Section 25, in the case at hand, one
would expect an extensive discussion of it. But, in fact, Marshall
dispenses with it summarily, referring readers who wanted more
to Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. In fact, Marshall
followed Story's Martin argument, which is to say that he rested
the Court's appellate powers on the wording of the Constitution,
amplified for effect by his own rendition of Revolutionary history.
It made for stirring rhetoric, but it was also a brilliant strategy.
To have emphasized Section 25, to have suggested even faintly
that the Court's appellate authority rested solely on that statute
184. See id. at 413-14 (expounding on the relationship of the states within
the national system of governance).
185. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 414-15.
186. Id. at 420.
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would have encouraged the Court's enemies to repeal it, which
they could do by a simple majority vote of Congress. Instead,
Marshall, like Story, rested the case on the Constitution itself.
Section 25, then, becomes evidence of the framers' intent.
Compelling evidence it was, since as he noted, "in the congress
which passed that act were many eminent members of the
Convention which formed the constitution."187 Moreover, he added
(in a statement that was hard to prove but impossible to refute)
"not a single individual, so far as is known, supposed that part of
the act which gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
the judgments of the State Courts, in the cases therein specified,
to be unauthorized by the constitution."'88 Behind Marshall's
reading of the Constitution were these eminent legislators as well
as eminent state judges, "whose talents and character would grace
any bench"189 and who had acknowledged the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court. Roane and Jefferson stood alone in their obstinacy,
because their ideas, if followed, would destroy the Constitution
and the federal union. The gauntlet was down, and it did not
matter that the Court went with Virginia on the merits of the case,
which it did almost as an after-thought.
Cohens was Marshall's last and greatest statement on the
nature of the federal union and the republican responsibilities of
the Court. But it did not settle the matter. Nor did it silence
Roane, who instantly answered Cohens in a series of essays in the
Richmond Enquirer,published between May 15 and July 13, 1821,
this time writing as "Algernon Sidney." "Somers" and "Fletcher of
Salturn," whose identities are not known, also joined in the
assault. These various essays are notable for their assertions
concerning the inevitable subjectivism of judicial decisions and
their ad hominem assault on Marshall, who is depicted as a traitor
to Virginia. As "Somers" put it, he "may have performed his
novitiate there

.

. . but the moment he passes the federal

threshold, he looks back with indifference on the schemes of his
juvenile experience; discards his former allegiance; and enters
with all the enthusiasm of a new convert." ' Roane's criticisms,
which echoed Jefferson's, were especially personal. Marshall's
"most awful" opinion, in addition to being all wrong was
"unusually tedious, and tautologous" (which it was).'
It was
replete with "premises which cannot be conceded" and took for
granted "the very points which are to be proved."

192

Roane

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 421.
190. RICHMOND ENQUIRER, May 15, 1821 (on file with author).
191. RICHMOND ENQUIRER, May 25, 1821 (on file with author).
192. "Algernon Sidney," RICHMOND ENQUIRER, May 29, 1821 (on file with
author).
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professed to want "no insurrections, no rebellions, no revolutions,"
but he summoned the Spirit of '98, and the spirit of the American
Revolution to aid Virginians in their renewed struggle against
tyranny. 93 He promised that Virginia judges would not be bowled
over "by the breath of a single man," and that he would hold the
ground staked out by Jefferson. 94
Marshall had, in effect, been expelled from his own state for
disloyalty. He was distressed but chose not to respond to the
attacks on Cohens, and when Roane died unexpectedly on
September 4, 1822, the great debate between the two men was
over for good. By that time, however, the arguments on both sides
had taken on a life of their own-in Virginia, in the course of the
1820s and early 1830s, and in the nation at large. Marshall feared
the worst. Indeed, at one point in Cohens, he prophesied that the
struggle with Virginia, should it become "universal" among the
other states, might end in a union-destroying war. "The people
made the constitution, and the people can unmake it." 9' If there is
a general "determination" to destroy the Union, "its effects will not
be restrained by parchment stipulations; the fate of the
constitution will not then depend on judicial decisions. "19
Marshall glimpsed here at what the 1820s would make more clear:
that the Court would not, in its ultimate relationship with
democratic politics, have the final word. He can be forgiven for
concluding that a Court that was not final was no court at all.
Historians, armed with retrospective wisdom, know that he was
wrong.
IV. A REPUBLICAN COURT IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITY

It might appear that Marshall won his great duel with Roane
and the Virginia theorists. After all, McCulloch still stands as
both a source of national authority and the universal touchstone of
constitutional interpretation. Cohens endures as the definitive
statement on the Court's appellate authority. Marshall's series of
brilliant polemic essays, written with passion and genius in the
heat of battle (and in the midst of his regular duties on circuit),
connect these two landmark decisions into a coherent statement
on the nature of sovereignty, the meaning of the Constitution, and
the republican duties of the Court. With the authority of the
Court behind him as well as, presumably, the force of the nation,
we might assume that the golden age of the Marshall Court was
indeed the golden age of American nationalism.
193. "Algernon Sidney," RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 1, 1821 (on file with
author).
194. "Algernon Sidney," RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 8, 1821 (on file with
author).
195. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 389.
196. Id.
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This familiar interpretation, which relies heavily on what
Marshall said rather than what happened as a consequence of
what he said, needs to be modified. If the 1820s saw "the
awakening of American nationalism," it also witnessed an even
more dramatic resurgence of states' rights and sectional selfconsciousness. Rather than clinching a victory for nationalism,
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch set in motion the forces of states'
rights that charted the direction of antebellum history. McCulloch
did, of course, put constitutional footing under the BUS, which
functioned effectively for several more years (thanks to the ability
of Nicholas Biddle, who became its president in 1823). What
Marshall's law established, however, Jacksonian politics and
Andrew Jackson, himself, undid. The president's suspicion of
banks, like much else in his political persuasion, was rooted in
personal experience. But it did not help that the Bank gave
preferential treatment to his opponents in the election campaign of
1828 or that a sizeable chunk of the Bank stock was held by
British investors. More important still was the convenience of the
"Monster Bank" as a political symbol of aristocracy in an age of
growing egalitarianism. Clay and Webster, Jackson's political
rivals in 1832, sealed the Bank's fate (and their presidential
ambitions as well) when they made early recharter an issue in the
election.
Though it lived on after 1836 as the Bank of
Pennsylvania, Biddle's Bank and the idea of a central regulatory
banking institution of any kind effectively died and remained dead
at least until the Civil War (and in reality until the creation of the
Federal Reserve system in 1913).197
Gone also, in a practical sense, with the emergence of the
Jacksonian Democrats, was Marshall's celebrated doctrine of
implied powers. The party of Jackson, which did so much to set
the permanent political agenda during the antebellum period,
believed as did Jefferson, whose ideas they borrowed, that the best
government was the least. The defeat of John Quincy Adams in
1828 doomed Clay's American Plan. While Congress retreated
from national planning, the new Jacksonian majority on the Taney
Court reasserted the constitutional primacy of states' rights.
Implied powers, in short, was not called on significantly again by
the Court until the surge of national legislation in the 1880s. It
was also entirely consistent with Jacksonian constitutional
principles that Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford98 should
have voided an act of Congress. Not coincidentally, that decision
also put to rest the possibility that Marshall's doctrine of implied
powers announced in 1819 would be put to antislavery uses." 9
197. HAMMOND, supra note 13, chs. 13 & 14.
198. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
199. For a discussion of the temporary demise of McCulloch, see R. Kent
Newmyer, John Marshall and the Southern Constitutional Tradition, in AN
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In other ways, political resistance diminished the authority of
the Marshall Court's decisions. Some state challenges were beat
back, most noticeably in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,"'
where the Court faced down Ohio over the enforcement of
McCulloch. Even when the Court's decisions were left standing,
however, their effect could be diluted or postponed by state
obstruction. Often, the Court itself modified earlier decisions
under pressure, through the familiar common law process of
distinguishing and clarifying terms. In some cases, outright
resistance was successful. An early example is New Jersey's
disregard for Marshall's opinion in New Jersey v. Wilson. 0 1 In
2 °2
1823, in the circuit case of Elkison v. Deliesseline,
Justice
William Johnson "hung himself on a democratic snag," °3 to use
Marshall's memorable words, when he ruled that South Carolina's
Negro Seaman Act was unconstitutional. Elkison is a decision
that was never enforced or reviewed by the Supreme Court. In the
same year Kentucky grassroots democracy successfully nullified
the impact of Green v. Biddle,2 °4 which struck down Kentucky
claimant laws designed to actually protect settlers against
absentee owners. Continued resistance to Green persuaded the
Court to silently reverse itself (via a statute of limitations
argument) in Hawkins v. Barney. °5 More well known, but not
atypical, was Georgia's defiance of the Marshall Court's later
decisions in the Georgia Indian cases.0 6
The message in all this-in the political and legal dissipation
of McCulloch and the considerable, varied state resistance to the
Court's appellate authority and to its substantive rulings-was
that law was not autonomous, the word of the Court was not
always final, and constitutional law was unavoidably connected to
politics. Given the origins and nature of the Constitution, it could
hardly have been otherwise. Certainly, the factors which the
framers at Philadelphia attempted to answer were as much
political (and economic) as legal. The document they submitted to
the states for ratification reflected this reality. The Constitution

UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH

(Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds. 1989).

200. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
201. 17 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
202. 8 F. Cass. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).
203. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 26, 1823), 9 PAPERS
OF JOHN MARSHALL at 338.
204. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
205. U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831). For a discussion of Kentucky's opposition to
Green v. Biddle, see 1 WARREN, supra note 95, at Ch. 16. For an admirably
lucid discussion of Henry Clay's role in Green v. Biddle, see generally
MAURICE G BAXTER, HENRY CLAY THE LAWYER (2000).

206. See, e.g., Steven R. Boyd, The Contract Clause and the Evolution of
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was Supreme Law and the Supreme Court it created was a legal
institution. But the Court was also dependent on the political
branches-on Congress in matters of structure, on the Senate and
the President in matters of appointments, and on the Executive
Branch regarding execution. A court, given the power to interpret
a constitution that was inherently political, was bound to be
enmeshed in politics. Nowhere was this more apparent than in
the constitutional clash between state and nation. When we
consider how imperfectly the line was drawn by the founding
fathers-how they backed away from clarity in order to achieve
agreement-we can appreciate just how political the law, which
Marshall and his Court aimed to administer and clarify, really
was. Long before Tocqueville said it, Marshall realized that in
America every major political question sooner or later, in one way
or another, turns into a constitutional one. When he admitted in
Cohens that the people who made the Constitution can also
destroy it, he acknowledged the political vulnerabilities of
supreme law.2"7
The real question is what did Marshall do with his wisdom
about the connectedness of constitutional law and democratic
politics? What he professed to do was to separate the two and
make the Court, first and foremost, a legal institution. This was
the central theme of his jurisprudence-proclaimed in Marbury,
acted on in McCulloch, defended against Roane, and reaffirmed in
Cohens. Marshall's pronouncements, on and off the Court, in this
regard ought to be seen as a coherent response to the larger
developments of the new age, especially to the newly emerging
democratic polity represented by the rise of political parties and
the emergence of the Jacksonian Democrats. Marshall intuited
what historians have come to understand more clearly: that the
Richmond Junto used the Court issue to consolidate the
Republican Party in Virginia, which-thanks to the organizing
genius of Martin Van Buren-joined with the Albany Regency in
1827 to form the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson. The new
party was professedly egalitarian and refashioned Jeffersonian
ideology to make the point. Like Jefferson, it believed that the
best government was the one that governed least. National
planning, like that championed by Henry Clay and John Quincy
Adams, was out, and state pluralism and states' rights were in. So
were political parties and professional politicians. Brokerage was
their forte. Operating on the principle that half-a-loaf is better
than none, the newly arisen tribe of professional politicians
worked to attract enough voters to dominate legislatures, win

207. On the complexity of federalism in the Constitution, see JACK ROKAVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
CONSTITUTION ch. 7 (1997).
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executive offices at the state level, and ultimately capture the
presidency itself. Old deferential leaders "stood" for office; modern
politicians "ran." What they chased was political power. It was a
new and different way to govern. Jefferson called it democracy;
Marshall called it demagoguery.
In the new age, political
compromise rather than republican truth became the guiding
spirit of the Constitution."°8
By fashioning the Court as a legal institution and viewing
judges as republican statesmen above the fray, Marshall set
himself against this new way of conducting constitutional
business. His plan, as Virginia critics hurried to point out, was
unavoidably elitist. In the political vernacular of the times, it was
"aristocratic" and, in the historian's view, "deferential." Even
friends of Marshall conceded the point, as did William Ellery
Channing, who defended Marshall's opinion in McCulloch on the
same ground that he defended the role of the learned clergy in
expounding scripture: that is, the God-given right of the learned to
interpret the text for the unregenerate. Even Marshall, at times,
seemed to concede the point, as when, in his debate with Roane, he
hoped that the people would trust the Court with the power he
claimed it had.
Trust, of course, was the watchword and
justification of the old deferential system of politics that Marshall
knew as a young man in Virginia. It was the glue that bound the
followers to natural leaders. It is not surprising that in his
defense of McCulloch, Marshall put his own reputation on the line
to make the point.
It was not just trust, on one hand, and noblesse oblige, on the
other, that Marshall relied on to justify and restrain the Court's
powers. Rather, it was legal science, as the lawyers of the early
republic understood that concept, and as he had practiced it for
nearly two decades in the Courts of Virginia. The heart of early
national legal science was the "taught tradition of the common
law." The framers, who did most to shape the institutional
contours of the federal court system in the Constitution, were
profoundly influenced by common law training and experience. °9
So were those members of the first Congress who passed the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and the several process acts of the 1790s,
which defined the working rules for the federal courts. No one,
208. For a discussion of the Virginia-New York axis and the emergence of
the Jacksonian Democratic Party, see generally ROBERT REMINI, THE
ELECTION OF 1828 (1963). For an exploration of the compromise function of
the American party system, see generally HERBERT AGAR, THE PRICE OF
UNION (1950); PETER B. KNUPFER, THE UNION AS IT IS: CONSTITUTIONAL

UNIONISM AND SECTIONAL COMPROMISE, 1787-1861 (1991).
209. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUs ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) (treating the common
law aspects of the Constitution on the common law background of Marshall's
constitutionalism).
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least of all John Marshall, could ignore the fact that interpreting a
written constitution that was the supreme law was a unique and
distinctly American undertaking.
Still, the whole idea of a
separate system of courts, proceeding by the adversarial method,
and applying generally agreed upon rules by agreed upon
procedure, originated in the common law.
Marshall's
constitutional world, as Charles Hobson has shown so clearly,
rested on a common law foundation.21 °
Marshall's conception of republican judging also rested on
common law premises. Specifically, it drew on the well developed
tradition of statutory interpretation-one which, as Jefferson
Powell has persuasively shown, was readily applicable to the text
of the written constitution.1 In this tradition, interpretation was
not only acceptable but indispensable.
In common law
hermeneutics, judges who interpreted statutes and other written
instruments of the law did not make law wholesale in the process
of applying it retail. What kept judging objective was the master
principle of stare decisis, which bound judges to previous decisions
when the factual situation was similar, plus the countless rules of
construction and substantive legal principles established in
centuries of case law. Probably no practicing common law judge
thought these principles were applied automatically and with
absolute objectivity. On the other hand, few doubted that the
common law system provided consistent and workable rules, free
of judicial whimsy and gross subjectivity. The simple fact that
ninety percent or more of the Supreme Court justice's work
involved common law cases made it all the easier to believe that
the same objective judging applied to constitutional cases as well.
The evidence points to the fact that Marshall sincerely
believed what he said in both Marbury and his defense of the
Court in the 1820s against the charge of political bias. He hoped,
no doubt (following the percolation-up principle in FederalistNo.
51), that Justices would be republican statesmen because they
were the best and brightest. But legal science helped make
disinterested statesmen of able judges who were all too human.
Principled judging did not have to be perfect either, since the
Court was competing for republican laurels with state legislatures.
Scholars know all too little about the actual process of law-making
at the state level in this period or at the congressional level for
that matter. But Marshall knew state legislatures first hand (as

210. CHARLES HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND

THE RULE OF LAW Ch. 2 (1996). See also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990).
211. For a discussion on the common law tradition of Constitutional
interpretation, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Interpretation, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 53-116 (Jack N. Rovake, ed. 1990).
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did Madison), and he did not respect what he saw. Structural
reforms possibly improved the legislative process at the state level
in the early republic as they did in Congress. But the overriding
development, as Marshall correctly perceived, was the emergence
of political parties. The driving principle of party power was
fundamentally linked to functional compromise. However, this
principle was at serious odds with the republican tradition of
disinterested
statesmanship, which Marshall associated with the
212
Court.

CONCLUSION

What impact, we may ask, did Marshall's belief in republican
(i.e. disinterested) judging have on the Court and its battle for
survival in the new democratic age? The definitive history of the
anti-court movement of the 1820s has yet to be written, and, in
any case, it is difficult if not impossible to trace precisely the
impact that ideas have on history. But certain things do seem
clear, the first being that the debate between Marshall and
Virginia-from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions to Marbury
onward and most intensively during the Roane-Marshall debate
from 1819 to 1821-set the stage for what followed. What followed
was an outpouring of measures for curbing judicial power and
undoing the position Marshall advocated in Marbury, McCulloch
and Cohens. Roane proposed that the state courts, sans Section
25, were the corrective. Jefferson worked behind the scenes,
urging Justice Johnson to reintroduce seriatim opinions and
dissents as a way of undercutting Marshall's dominance, which
the South Carolinian did in fact do. Senator Johnson from
Kentucky joined in the demand for institutional curbs on judicial
review. Even Marshall's cousin Humphrey Marshall joined the
feeding frenzy. Several state legislatures joined in with anti-court
resolutions and a wide range of reforms designed to curb the
Court's interpretive powers. John Bannister Gibson of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court added intellectual respectability to
the attack (although it should be noted that his blast against
21
Marshall's conception of judicial review in Eakin v. Raub 1
appeared in a dissenting opinion). State opposition carried into
Congress, too, which debated various measures for curbing the
Court. One of the most revealing suggestions-since it was based
on the premise that all constitutional adjudication was politicalwas to make the senate the final judge in constitutional cases
involving federalism. Another was to create a special court
212. Joseph Story justifies judicial review d la Marshall by reference to legal
science, see JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

Book III, Chs. 4, 5, & 38 (1891).
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composed of the chief justices of all the states with the final
authority in such cases. 14
Most of these measures barely got off the ground and all
crashed for want of support. The most threatening was the
attempt, spearheaded by Virginia, to repeal Section 25, which
could be done by a simple legislative majority and which would
make the supreme court of each state the final authority on the
Constitution. One man who watched the process of this movement
carefully and learned from it was John C. Calhoun of South
Carolina. Calhoun began his career as a nationalist and shifted to
states' rights only when state interests in South Carolina
demanded it. As late as 1823, he was so bold as to support
Marshall's decision regarding that section in Cohens. However,
the states' rights sentiment prompted by the slave rebellion in
Charleston in 1822 changed his mind. He ended up backing the
movement to curb the Court's appellate powers, and when that
failed, he crafted his own method of asserting state control over
constitutional interpretation. This theory of state control, known
familiarly as the theory of nullification, was adopted by the South
Carolina legislature in 1828 and put into action in 1831.
Calhoun took over where Roane and Virginia left off. Like
them, he believed, as he put it to Virgil Maxcy in 1831, that the
issue was between the Supreme Court and the people of the
states. 15 Working from the tradition begun in 1798 and indeed in
the ratification debates, Calhoun came forward with a device that
made states (or as Calhoun would say, the people of the state) the
final authorities on the Constitution. Acting through specially
called constitutional conventions, states could challenge the
constitutionality of an act of Congress by declaring it null and void
within the state. If the national government let the nullification
stand, then ipso facto the law was void-presumably not only in
the state that nullified it, but also in other states as well. On the
other hand, Congress could initiate an amendment authorizing
Congress to enact the disputed law (say a protective tariff), and if
a sufficient number of states ratified, the constitutional contract
(as Calhounites referred to the Constitution) was in effect
redrawn. Each state, as party to the contract (in Calhoun's
formulation), then had a choice. They could ratify or not. If one
fourth of the states plus one failed to do so, those states in effect
would have exercised a veto.
In this way, a minority of
slaveholding states had a concurrent veto over the dominant
majority. If the amendment was ratified, any state that did not
214. For a discussion on the anti-Court movement, see WARREN, supra note
95, at ch. 17.
215. See UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C.

CALHOUN, (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) (providing a collection of relevant
documents).
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accept the new Constitution would thus secede from the Union.
Building on the assumption that the Constitution was a contract
created by sovereign states, Calhoun supplied what early theorists
like Taylor, Jefferson, and Madison had only hinted at: a
mechanism of implementation, which claimed to be both peaceful
and constitutional. 216
The pending showdown between Marshall, the Court, and the
forces of states' rights, which Calhoun predicted, came in 1832
when South Carolina applied Calhoun's theory by nullifying the
tariffs of 1828 and 1832. What happened would appear to be a
decisive victory for Marshall's view of the Court as the final
interpreter of the Constitution. First, because no other state, in
the North or South, joined South Carolina at the nullification
barricade, and second, because President Jackson threatened to
use federal troops to suppress South Carolina's resistance to
federal law. The fact that Jackson was elected on a states' rights
platform and had, in fact, opposed Marshall's version of
constitutional nationalism made his action all the more
significant. 217 Equally telling in this regard was the fact that
James Madison, whose ideas and authority contributed to
Calhoun's doctrine, now in the last years of his life, threw his
support to the Court. Madison, it will be recalled, called Marshall
into action in defense of the Constitution and judicial review in the
Virginia ratifying convention and praised Marshall for his efforts.
As president, he had backed the Marshall Court in its bitter
confrontation with Pennsylvania in 1809. Madison was also the
author of the Kentucky Resolution of 1798 and the Virginia report
of 1799. He had serious constitutional objections to Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch and the broad conception of judicial power on
which it was based. When confronted with the radical, unhinging
implications of nullification, however, he shifted course yet again.
Calhoun had taken both Jackson and Madison to the precipice,
and after gazing into the abyss, they withdrew to moderate
ground. An imperfect Court was better than a perfectly logical
constitutional system which almost certainly would destroy the
union.218
Thanks to Marshall's fans, however, and especially the New
England publicists who came to his defense in the 1820s, it was
not an imperfect Court (or a less than perfect Chief Justice) that
made it into American text books. New England "sectional
216. For a discussion of Calhoun and the nullifiers, see CHARLES M. WILTSE,
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nationalists" (as, one insightful scholar has called them) had the
final word on Marshall and his enemies. 19 What they said and
wrote contributed both to the myth of both Marshall and the
Supreme Court. Never mind that New England's law-abiding
statesmen retreated into states' rights theorization after losing to
Jefferson in 1800 or that they defied national law on a massive
scale during the War of 1812, and took their section to the brink of
secession in the Hartford Convention. New England rediscovered
nationalism again in the 1820s when it suited its economic
interests. When New England capitalists joined the nationalist
market revolution, they gained a new appreciation of Marshall
and the Court. What New England thought counted throughout
the rest of the nation. With Boston as its hub and Harvard as its
intellectual nerve center, New England conservatives mobilized
New England culture against Southern states' rights supporters.
John Marshall and his Court were among the chief beneficiaries.
In the several years after 1815, for example, the North American
Review (the leading New England journal of the period) contained
no less than seven essays and reviews that praised Marshall, his
Court, and criticized his critics. More importantly, the leading
lawyers of New England came to his defense-none more
effectively than Daniel Webster. Webster identified himself with
New England, New England with the nation, and the nation with
Marshall's constitutional nationalism.
When the "godlike"
thundered, New England, indeed the nation, listened. Webster
spoke consistently before the Court, where he contributed to
Marshall's thinking. Now he spoke on behalf of the Court-and
never more effectively than in the Webster-Hayne debates of 1830.
There, with the help of Justice Story, Webster set out to prove to
the nation that John Marshall's Court was the last best hope of
national union against the unhinging doctrines of John C.
Calhoun." °
Webster was a host, but it was really Marshall's colleague
Story, who had the final word, one which was much amplified by
his reputation on the Court and his position as Dane Professor at
Harvard Law School. Working with Nathan Dane and Josiah
Quincy, Story brought the Law School back from the dead in the
same year that Jackson attained the presidency. Its avowed
purpose was to train elite lawyers equipped with up-to-date
commercial law and nationalist constitutional principles to
219. For the definitive work on New England conservatives, see generally
HARLOW W. SHEIDLEY, SECTIONAL NATIONALISM:
MASSACHUSETTS
CONSERVATIVE LEADERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1836
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counteract the new professional states' rights politicians. To this
end Story wrote his Commentaries on the Constitution in three
volumes in 1833.221 He dedicated this remarkable work to John
Marshall in an impassioned letter, which celebrated his republican
virtue and unparalleled knowledge of the Constitution which was
"destined to enlighten, instruct, and convince future generations"
and, more to the task at hand, "dissipate the illusions of ingenious
doubt and subtle argument and impassioned eloquence" of his
southern critics."' Marshall responded with much gratitude and
the hope that the Commentaries would rescue the country from
states' rights madness. Indeed, this was its avowed purpose.
Written in the midst of the nullification crisis, the massive work
was a direct response to Calhoun's theory of nullification. To that
end, it was also a massive justification of Marshall's view of the
Court as final republican interpreter of the Constitution.
Following Marshall and quoting his opinions copiously, Story
justified judicial review because the Justices were uniquely
situated institutionally and intellectually to exercise it objectively.
Like Marshall, he believed that the intent of the framers was set
forth in the words of the Constitution for the guidance of the
Justices. Armed with the science of the law, the Court could apply
those principles fairly and equitably. To aid them in that noble
enterprise, he listed nineteen specific "Rules of Interpretation,"
most of which came directly from Marshall's opinions and
particularly those from the 1820s. 3
Story's Commentaries remained the preeminent text on the
Constitution for the remainder of the 19th Century and into the
20th as well. As much as anything except the Supreme Court
reports themselves, it established the lasting reputation of John
Marshall and his view of the Court as an institution above politics.
At the very moment of its inception, however, this view was out of
sync with the realties of history, and Marshall himself stood
witness to the fact. His republican vision of the Court, like Story's
and Tocqueville's too, was that the Court, armed with
constitutional truth and legal science, would curb democracy or
the "tyranny of the majority," as Tocqueville put it. But rather
than standing above the political process, the Marshall Court
increasingly became a part of it-an integral part, no less. The
anti-Court movement of the 1820s and early 1830s tells the story.
What it tells us is that the Court survived, but not because South
Carolina conceded to the wisdom of Marshall, which it most
assuredly did not, or because Jackson converted to Marshall's view
221. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
STATES (Melville Madison Bigelow, ed. 1891).
222. Id. at ch. 5.
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of the Constitution, his conversion was a temporary and partial.
What happened instead was that the Court saved itself. First, it
deftly maneuvered and conceded to the states a good bit of what
they demanded, which Marshall's federalism properly allowed it to
do. What mainly placated the Court's enemies, however, was that
they gradually gained a voice on the Court itself-loud enough, if
we are to believe Marshall, to "revolutionize" the institution from
the inside out. Marshall did not give up the battle for republican
truth, but he recognized that the Court which was supposed to be
above politics and indeed to control politics, had itself been
politicized. This did not mean that the Court had lost its power, as
Marshall concluded, but only that its decisions were not final. It
was not an easy truth for Marshall to live with. He died believing
that the Court and the Constitution he loved were in a downward
and perhaps irreversible spiral.

